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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays investigating participation effects in house-
hold financial decisions. In the first essay, entitled ”Household Mortgage Choice and
Mortgage Market Participation,” I empirically study a household’s choice of an ad-
justable rate mortgage (ARM) over a fixed rate mortgage (FRM) across time. This
decision has been investigated in the cross-section previously, but to date, no one
has studied how a household’s choice of mortgage contract type changes as they
gain experience in the mortgage market. This study investigates whether mortgage
market participation has a systematic effect on the choice of an ARM vs. an FRM
within a household. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), I document a novel stylized fact: a household’s
propensity to choose an adjustable rate ARM over an FRM increases with the num-
ber of previous mortgages the household has used. Households do not choose an
ARM due to budget or liquidity constraints when increasing housing consumption;
nor is the observed pattern of increased propensity to choose an ARM with mortgage
market participation explained by the simultaneous relaxation of budget constraints
as homeowners participate in the mortgage market. Stabilization of a household’s
income stream and rising home prices are also ruled out as the source of increasing
ARM choice propensity with greater utilization of mortgages, as is expected length
of tenure. Evidence is presented supporting the hypothesis that households learn
about mortgage products by participating in the market.
iv
In the second essay, entitled ”Participation Effects in Refinancing Decisions”,
I investigate household refinancing decisions in the context of market participation.
Using optimal refinance interest rate differentials as derived in Agarwal, Driscoll, and
Laibson (2012), I document an important participation effect in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, whereby households with greater mortgage market participation,
as measured by previous mortgages used, are more likely to refinance optimally. This
result is robust to potential liquidity constraints, where the household fails to refi-
nance due to an inability to pay any fixed costs associated with the transaction.
Participation effects persist even when controlling for the potential of equity extrac-
tion as the primary motivation for refinancing. These results are consistent with an
information acquisition model, whereby households gain knowledge and understand-
ing of financial transactions by participating in financial markets.
v
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1Mortgage Choice and Mortgage Market
Participation
1.1 Introduction
It is important to understand how and why households make decisions in the context
of financial markets. The relationship between directly held household financial
assets and total financial assets since 2000 can be seen in Figure 1.1. According to
the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Account, households financial assets, in
the form of equities, bonds, money market accounts, mutual funds and other assets,
amounted to over $41 trillion, or 30% of the US total, in 2009. This is not a trivial
amount. As we might expect from looking at Figure 1.1, the aggregate decisions of
households clearly have important economy-wide impacts, as demonstrated in the
recent financial crisis, where the mortgage market collapsed and it’s effects rippled
through the rest of the economy.
One potential factor in a household’s financial decision making is participation in
financial markets. van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) show that financial literacy
is correlated with participation in equity markets, so we might expect a household
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Figure 1 - Household Financial Assets
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Figure 1.1: This graph displays the ev lution of directly held aggregate household
financial assets along with total financial assets in the U.S. economy. Aggregate
household financial assets account for a substantial portion of total financial assets
in the economy, varying between 28 and 35% of the total over the last 12 years.
to systematically change its financial decision making process with participation in
financial markets. To study this effect, we will turn to the mortgage market, which
has some very important advantages in investigating market participation’s effects on
household decision making. First, purchasing a home is something most households
will undertake in their lifetime, with sixty-five percent of all households owning their
home, and for households with a head over sixty-five, that number increases to over
eighty percent nationally. Second, most households have a substantial portion of
their wealth tied up in housing. Because homes usually account for such a large
proportion of household wealth, most home purchases are financed with a mortgage,
creating a highly levered position in the household’s portfolio, making it potentially
the most important financial decision a household will ever make. Third, it is a
transaction likely to be repeated multiple times by the same household, and finally,
data are readily available.
To briefly introduce mortgage contracts, they are complicated financial instru-
ments that come in two broad classes: fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable
or variable rate mortgages (ARMs). Fixed rate mortgages have a fixed nominal in-
2
terest rate and constant nominal payment over the life of the loan, which is usually
fifteen or thirty years in the United States. There is usually no penalty for prepay-
ment of the loan. While FRMs have a fixed nominal capital value, their real value
varies with real interest rates. If rates are low relative to when the loan was taken
out, FRMs are expensive and the real wealth of the household falls, while if rates are
high, FRMs are cheap and real wealth of the household is relatively large, so there is
substantial wealth risk associated with fixed rate mortgages. It should also be noted
that FRMs are expensive when interest rates are stable. Households must pay for the
prepayment option usually found in fixed rate contracts by paying a higher interest
rate than they otherwise would have, if the mortgage did not include a prepayment
option.
Adjustable rate mortgages trade off the wealth risk of an FRM for income risk.
The interest rate on an ARM adjusts to prevailing nominal rates, usually at a 1 year
frequency. Because of these adjustments, ARMs have relatively stable real capital
values, but have risky nominal payments, so ARMs are expensive if rates rise. In
most cases, initial rates for ARMs are lower than FRMs to compensate borrowers
for taking on this interest rate risk. In recent years the one year ARM, where the
interest rate adjusts annually starting with the first year and which has been the
standard variable rate contract, has all but disappeared from the market. A hybrid
contract with an initial fixed rate period, usually 3, 5, or 7 years, followed by a period
where rates are adjusted annually, has become the dominant form of adjustable rate
mortgages. These contracts are treated as forms of adjustable rate mortgages.
The choice of an ARM vs. an FRM in the cross-section has been extensively
studied in the literature. However, no one has investigated how this decision changes
within a given household over time. This study will demonstrate that the propensity
to choose an ARM increases with mortgage market participation. While controlling
for factors found to be important to the choice of mortgage contract type, households
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obtaining their second mortgage are about 8 percentage points more likely to acquire
some form of adjustable rate loan than they were for their first mortgage. Households
who have extensive experience in the mortgage market are even more likely to use
an adjustable rate contract. Having 4 or more previous mortgages translates to a 20
percentage point increase in the probability of choosing an ARM as compared to the
household’s first mortgage. The effects of factors previously shown to influence the
choice of an ARM over a fixed rate mortgage, such as likelihood of moving, income
volatility and pricing variables are consistent with previous literature, but do not
explain the observed pattern.
We can see the significance of housing in household assets in Figure 1.2, which
shows house value as a percentage of total assets plotted against the wealth distribu-
tion. The data come from the 2009 panel of the Survey of Consumer Finances. For
the middle half of the distribution, house value accounts for well over fifty percent
of total wealth. For comparison, the percentage of wealth held in corporate equities
is also plotted. For all but the richest households, public equities are a negligible
component of a wealth when compared to a home. Figure 1.2 also plots the propor-
tion of households who have mortgage debt against the distribution of wealth. We
see this closely matches the distribution of house value as a percentage of wealth
showing that most households carry mortgage debt
In the United States, fixed rate mortgages are by far the dominant mortgage type.
Figure 1.3 shows the fixed rate mortgage market share over the last 22 years. FRMs
have been the prevailing contract in the market, ranging between sixty-five percent
in the early 2000s and ninety percent of the mortgage market today. There are a
number of potential reasons for this fact, including risk aversion, relative complex-
ity of adjustable rate mortgage terms, government supported liquidity and cultural
traditions. An FRM has a fixed payment for the entire life of the loan, so the bor-
rower knows exactly how much he will have to pay every month. As well, fixed
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Figure 2 - Home and Equity Value as Percentage of Wealth
Figure 1.2: This graph plots household home prices (”house”) and public equity
value as a percentage of household assets against the distribution of wealth. ”Mort-
gage Debt” gives the percentage of each wealth quantile that carries mortgage debt.
Data come from the 2009 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) panel study.
rate contracts are very simple compared to adjustable rate mortgages, consisting
of an interest rate, principle and loan term. These two characteristics can be very
appealing to households. While an FRM has a fixed nominal payment for a fixed
term, adjustable rate contracts often have variable payments. ARMs have additional
contractual terms as well, including but not limited to different rate adjustment pe-
riods, an interest rate index which determines changes in payments, and annual and
life-of-loan rate caps.
State support for fixed rate mortgages is executed by government sponsored enti-
ties such as Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae’s stated purpose
is “to keep money flowing to mortgage lenders, to help strengthen the U.S. housing
and mortgage markets, and to support affordable homeownership.” By buying loans
from mortgage lenders, Fannie Mae has helped maintain high liquidity in mortgage
lending markets, keeping rates low. Ginnie Mae acts as a guarantor for the timely
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Figure 2 presents time series for the market share of fixed rate mortgages and the
1-yr and 10-yr treasury yields.
Figure 2 - FRM Market Share and Treasury Yields
Figure 1.3: Figure 2 presents time series for the market share of fixed rate mort-
gages and the 1-yr and 10-yr treasury yields. Data come from Freddie Mac’s Primary
Mortgage Market Survey and United States Department of the Treasury
payment of mortgage interest and principle, allowing mortgage lenders to get better
prices in the secondary market and keep rates low. Freddie Mac is an intermediary,
buying consumer loans on the secondary market and issuing guaranteed mortgage
backed securities with these loans as the underlying asset. Government support for
consumer mortgage markets in the form of these three entities has maintained a
highly liquid secondary market for mortgages. High liquidity reduces the costs of
lending and maintains mortgage rates at relatively low levels. Finally, adjustable
rate contracts were not available until the 1980s, when they enjoyed some popularity
due to high interest rates. However, by this time government supported fixed rate
contracts were what most people thought about when discussing mortgages, and
little has changed today.
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Though fixed rate contracts have the lion’s share of the market, little work has
been done investigating which type of mortgage is best for households. Campbell
and Cocco (2003) is one exception. The authors build a life-cycle model of mortgage
choice and examine the welfare implications of nominal FRMs and ARMs. Results
show that FRMs should be relatively more desirable for households with large homes
relative to income, high income volatility, low probability of moving and high default
costs. However, when the model is calibrated to data from 1986 to 1999, an FRM is
never better in a welfare sense than an ARM.
Empirically, Dhillon, Shilling, and Sirmans (1987) argue that mortgage pricing
variables are the main determinant of mortgage choice and that borrower character-
istics play little to no role in this decision. One possible caveat to this which the
authors discuss is borrower mobility. Because of the lower initial rates of ARMs and
relative stability of interest rates over short horizons, if a borrower expects to move
in the near future they should be more likely to choose an adjustable rate mortgage.
Brueckner and Follain (1988) add support for this argument.
Borrower characteristics have been shown to play a role, however, when differen-
tiated ARM contracts are considered. Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) show that when
different types of variable rate mortgages are available, such as 5/1 or 7/1 ARMs,
more mobile and younger borrowers choose shorter initial fixed rate terms. Addi-
tionally, Stanton and Wallace (1998) show that the menu of points and rates given
for FRM contracts serves as a method of separating higher mobility borrowers from
lower mobility borrowers, with higher mobility borrowers paying less in points and
taking a higher interest rate. Brueckner (1994) shows that the most mobile borrow-
ers will self-select into ARM contracts, and as discussed earlier, Campbell and Cocco
(2003) add to the theoretical support for the argument that highly mobile borrowers
benefit from the lower rates on ARMs.
Phillips and Vander Hoff (1991) show that mortgage choice is sensitive to initial
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“teaser” rates on ARMs and the ratio of points on FRMs to points on ARMs. They
also find that the level of housing prices is positively related to the choice of an
ARM. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) Coulibaly and Li (2009) give
evidence further supporting the role of pricing in mortgage choice. Additionally,
they give empirical support to the argument of Campbell and Cocco (2003) that
more risk averse home buyers will have a lower propensity to choose an adjustable
rate mortgage. Koijen, Hemert, and Nieuwerburgh (2009) show that the bond risk
premium, defined as the difference between long term interest rates and expected
average short rates for the same horizon, explains a large portion of ARM share
in the aggregate and ARM choice at the micro level. They find that a household
decision rule using the average of recent short rates and long term treasury yields is
the best predictor of ARM share.
This study will break from this literature by studying the mortgage choice decision
repeatedly across time within a household. To date, the impact of mortgage market
participation and its interaction with factors shown to be important in the cross-
section has not been studied. It will show that participation in the mortgage market
has an important impact in the choice of an ARM vs. an FRM, in addition to
previously identified variables.
Classic finance theory shows that in a frictionless world, households make mean
variance efficient choices. However, in practice there are many frictions. Addoum
(2012) shows that when a households consists of more than a single individual, bar-
gaining considerations become important. If risk aversion of household members is
different, portfolio allocations can be different than if either individual were making
the decision independently. van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) show that finan-
cial literacy is an important determinant of a household’s financial decisions. They
devise an index of financial literacy and show that stock market participation is pos-
itively related to financial literacy. Additionally, they show that literacy increases
8
with age, and comment that people may be be gaining financial sophistication as
they participate in financial markets. This paper gives support for that argument
showing experience in financial markets is a key component of household financial
decisions.
The rest of the paper will have the following structure. Section II will present
and summarize data used to show that households learn about ARMs and their
advantages. Section III will present the main methodology and results. Section IV
will give robustness checks and finally, Section V will conclude.
1.2 Data
Data from several sources are used to examine household mortgage choice decisions,
including the Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS), Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
1.2.1 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is the primary source for the
analysis. The PSID is the longest running longitudinal study in the world and was
administered annually from 1968 until 1997. Since 1997, data have been collected
biennially and the most recent year for which data are available is 2009. Data from
the 1978 wave onward are used to impute the number of mortgage contracts a given
household has used in its lifetime. Regression analysis uses ten unbalanced panels,
the PSID waves from 1996-1997 and the biennial surveys from 1999 to 2009.
The PSID asks “Do you have a mortgage or loan on this property [home]?” in
every year of the survey since 1983 and in the 1979-1981 period. The question-
naire goes on to ask “What year did you obtain that loan?” since the 1997 survey.
Responses to these two questions are used to impute the number of mortgages the
household has had and to create a sample of mortgage choice decisions. Additionally,
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the survey asked “What is the current interest rate on that loan?” since 1996, and
in the years 1996, 2007 and 2009 “Is the interest rate on that mortgage or loan fixed
or variable?” Responses to the second question give a direct answer to the question
of the loan being an FRM or ARM, but changes in the reported interest rate can be
used to impute the loan type (ARM vs. FRM) by comparing rates across years for
loans within a household with the same origination year.
Table 1.1 has summary statistics for the PSID. Panel B gives summary statistics
by year for wealth, income, and demographic variables. Panel (A) gives values for the
whole sample, (B) for homeowners, (C) for mortgagors, and panel (D) gives summary
statistics for households with a new mortgage. Homeowners tend to be wealthier
than non-homeowners, consistent with Figure 1.2, however, there is no appreciable
difference in total assets between all homeowners and the subset of homeowners with
mortgages. Mortgagors have higher income than homeowners in general, likely due
to a larger fraction of retirees owning their homes outright. We see the rise in home
values associated with the run-up to 2007, followed by the subsequent fall in house
prices. There are no appreciable differences in education between new mortgagors
and mortgagors in general. If the household enters the sample with a mortgage, that
is assumed to be the first mortgage contract the household has ever had. The average
age at which households enter the estimation sample is 30 years of age, so it is likely
that any mortgage held when entering the sample is close to the first mortgage of
the household. Panel (E) gives the distribution of total mortgages a households has
held when a new mortgage is taken out. We see there is substantial variation across
the number of mortgages previously held. Analysis will account for the systematic
differences shown here.
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Table 1.1: This table gives median values for dollar denominated variables and age,
and mean values for binary variables for the PSID. Values are computed using the
weights provided in the PSID. Panels A-D give means by year from 1999 to 2009.
Panel (A) gives values for the entire PSID. Panel (B) gives values for homeowners
only. Panel (C) gives values for mortgage holders, and Panel (D) gives values for
mortgages initiated in the specified year. Panel (E) gives the distribution of previous
mortgages for households with a new mortgage. This will be our measure of mortgage
market participation.Table 1 - Means and Medians for the PSID, by Year and Mortgage Status
Panel A - Overall
Total Assets Income Principal Net Worth House Value Age Education Homeowner
1999 119 51 0 66 77 46 12 0.64
2001 129 52 0 73 85 47 12 0.65
2003 135 50 0 71 93 48 12 0.66
2005 148 49 0 76 99 48 12 0.65
2007 151 50 0 78 98 49 13 0.64
2009 128 50 0 53 89 50 13 0.62
Panel B - Homeowners
Total Assets Income Principal Net Worth House Value Age Education Mortgage
1999 213 64 37 148 130 51 13 0.65
2001 225 66 39 160 151 51 13 0.67
2003 245 65 47 160 163 51 13 0.67
2005 275 65 55 186 187 52 13 0.68
2007 300 68 54 200 207 53 13 0.67
2009 263 69 59 160 180 54 14 0.68
Panel C - All Mortgages
Total Assets Income Principal Net Worth House Value Age Education New Mortgage
1999 210 76 77 117 148 45 14 0.44
2001 228 78 84 127 157 46 14 0.32
2003 246 76 93 129 175 46 14 0.54
2005 278 77 100 152 198 47 14 0.52
2007 303 79 106 167 223 48 14 0.36
2009 257 80 110 123 200 49 14 0.29
Panel D - New Mortgages
Total Assets Income Principal Net Worth House Value Age Education Refinance
1999 219 78 103 103 161 42 14 0.46
2001 219 77 101 95 164 42 14 0.35
2003 278 84 128 135 209 45 14 0.63
2005 311 82 132 152 220 44 14 0.56
2007 298 76 150 125 233 43 14 0.44
2009 281 81 150 106 205 45 14 0.51
Panel E - Distribution of Number of Mortgages
Mortgages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
30.67% 35.26% 18.80% 9.54% 4.07% 1.34% 0.29% 0.04%
Table 1 gives median values for dollar denominated variables and age, and mean values for binary variables for the PSID.  Values are computed using the weights 
provided in the PSID. Panels A-D give means by year from 1999 to 2009.  Panel A gives values for the entire PSID.  Panel B gives values for homeowners only.  Panel C 
gives values for mortgage holders, and Panel D gives values for mortgages initiated in the specified year.  Panel E gives the distribution of previous mortgages for 
households with a new mortgage.  This will be our measure of mortgage market participation.
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1.2.2 Survey of Consumer Finances
The Survey of Consumer Finances, normally a cross-sectional survey administered
every three years, extended their 2007 study to include a 2009 re-interview, creating
a longitudinal data set. This panel includes almost 4,000 (3,857) households and
includes an oversample of the wealthy. Weights are included so unbiased estimates
for US totals can be calculated. Participants give extensive data about mortgages,
financial assets and expectations. Additionally, household characteristics are col-
lected, including employment, education, and demographics. Table 2 gives summary
statistics by year and mortgage status for financial and mortgage variables, using
the weights provided by the survey.
The first section of Table 1.2 has statistics for the whole sample, and we see that
wealth, measured as both total assets and net worth, fell between 2007 and 2009
as did income. The proportion of the sample who owned their home was relatively
stable at about 70%. The second section of the table gives summary statistics for
these homeowners. Almost 69% of homeowners had a mortgage in 2007, which fell
slightly to 65% in 2009. Importantly, house values fell considerably during this time
period, dropping nearly 17% from a little over $300,000 to about $250,000. The
third section of Table 2, which shows statistics for households with a mortgage,
indicates that the number of mortgages initiated in the previous year rose slightly
from 29% to about 32%. We also see that about 14% of mortgages outstanding were
variable rate in 2007, which fell slightly to about 12% in 2009. More significantly,
the proportion of new mortgages that were adjustable rate fell dramatically between
2007 and 2009, which can be seen in the final section of the table. The last section
shows statistics for those who took out a mortgage in 2007 or 2009. We see that a
little over 18% of newly initiated mortgages were adjustable rate in 2007, but this
fell to just over 8% in 2009. Additionally, the proportion of new mortgages that were
12
Table 1.2: This table gives summary statistics for the Survey of Consumer Finance
2007-2009 Panel, by year and mortgage status. Wealth falls for all categories, while
income remains the same for all but new mortgages, where income rises. This shows
that new mortgagors generally have higher incomes in 2009 than in 2007. Otherwise,
patterns are largely similar to those for the PSID.Table 2 - SCF Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
2007 Total Assets 497,946    189,124 685,660            298,884 612,854    310,559 564,217    305,444
Total Income 85,637      47,596 105,356            61,668 108,250    72,429 99,794      68,083
Original Principal 184,956    145,577 184,956            145,577 184,956    145,577 210,438    173,838
Net Worth 509,271    104,238 697,405            201,519 553,900    173,171 435,763    122,124
House Value 211,524    124,164 302,528            206,940 323,124    228,669 320,806    243,569
Age 49             48 53                     52 48             47 44             42
Education 13             13 14                     14 14             14 14             14
Homeowner 0.70          1 1                       1 1.00          1 1.00          1
Mortgage 0.48          -          0.68                  1 1               1 1               1
ARM 0.07          -          0.10                  -          0.14          -          0.18          -          
New Mortgage 0.13          -          0.19                  -          0.27          -          1               1
Refinance 0.22          -          0.31                  -          0.45          -          0.39          -          
2009 Total Assets 429,174    170,084 582,510            258,630 519,232    267,380 542,868    281,668
Total Income 80,662      49,200 96,957              60,200 105,062    75,200 102,989    78,000
Original Principal 187,451    148,196 187,451            148,196 187,451    148,196 198,057    158,661
Net Worth 410,821    79,882 554,619            150,734 429,134    119,425 429,553    111,324
House Value 180,479    115,600 252,552            175,000 270,588    195,000 294,276    211,800
Homeowner 0.71          1 1.00                  - 1.00          1 1.00          1
Mortgage 0.47          -          0.65                  1             1.00          1 1.00          1
ARM 0.05          -          0.08                  -          0.12          -          0.08          -          
New Mortgage 0.15          -          0.21                  -          0.32          -          1.00          1
Refinance 0.08          -          0.11                  -          0.17          -          0.50          1
Table 2 gives summary statistics for the Survey of Consumer Finance 2007-2009 Panel, by year and mortgage status.  Wealth falls for all categories, while income remains the 
same for all but new mortgages, where income rises.  This shows that new mortgagors generally have higher incomes in 2009 than in 2007.  Otherwise, patterns are largely 
similar to those for the PSID.
All Homeowners All Mortgages New Mortgages
refinances rose significantly between 2007 and 2009, jumping from 39% to over 50%.
Overall, households increased their refinancing activity and decreased their usage of
adjustable rate mortgage instruments.
1.3 Analysis
1.3.1 PSID
Variables
The long running PSID, with its panel structure and extensive data, is a valuable
resource to investigate within-household financial decision making. The empirical
model of interest is the household fixed-effect model,
ARMit  Γ  PREV MORTGit   β Xit   Ψ  AFEit   it (1.1)
The dependent variable, ARMit, is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the
household chooses an ARM. The vector PREV MORTGit is defined as PREV MORTGit 
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rPM2it, PM
3,4
it , PM
5 
it s. The first variable takes a value of 1 if the household has had
only one previous mortgage (i.e. the current loan is only the second one in the life
of the household). The second component takes a value of 1 if the current loan is
the third or fourth in the life of the household, and the final element takes a value
of 1 if the current loan is the fifth or greater for the household and zero otherwise.
The vector of controls, Xit, includes those listed in Table 3, which will be discussed
in detail below.
We also have an additional control vector, AFEit which consists of various fixed
effects beyond the household fixed effect estimator being used. These includeREGIONit, Y EARt,
and TIMEt INDUSTRYit. Historically, ARMs have been a more popular choice in
certain geographic areas of the country. The Western portion of the United States,
where real estate prices are relatively high has had a greater proportion of mortgages
originated as adjustable rate loans. Regional fixed effects, REGIONSit, are included
to control for these systematic differences in the propensity to choose an ARM across
geographic areas. The price of an adjustable rate mortgage relative to a fixed rate
mortgage has varied over time. Additionally, there are other time specific factors
that should be controlled for in a regression context, such as regulation (Campbell,
Ramadorai, and Ranish (2012)), the overall health and performance of the economy,
and the interest rate environment at any given time (Koijen et al., 2009). These fac-
tors should influence mortgage choice and time fixed-effects are included to account
for them. Additionally, time-industry interaction effects are included to account for
income volatility within industry and across time. Income volatility will be discussed
in more detail later.
Table 1.3 presents the elements of Xit. As discussed earlier, the shorter the ex-
pected tenure of a household in a given home, the larger the relative benefits of an
adjustable rate mortgage. If the household is moving soon, interest rates should
be relatively stable over the household’s expected life of the loan and the house-
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Table 1.3: This table lists and explains the main covariates used in the regression
analysis for the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Variable Description
DEFINITELY MOVE Indicator for self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years of 
LIKELY MOVE Indicator for self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years being 
"probably move"
MAYBE MOVE Indicator for self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years being 
"maybe move"
MOVED Indicator if the household moved
NET WORTH Assets less liabilities of the household
NW/HOUSE VALUE Net worth normalized by original principal on the mortgage
HVAL/INCOME Value of the home normalized by total income
TOTAL INCOME Total household income from all sources for the year in which the 
mortgage was originated
INCOME/MPMT Total annual mortgage payments normalized by total income
LOAN-TO-VALUE Original principal as a percentage of the purchase price of the home
LOAN-TO-VALUE2 Loan-to-value squared
REFINANCE Indicator equal to 1 if the loan was to refinance an existing mortgage
EMPLOYED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is employed
RETIRED Indicator equal to 1 if the head is retired.
AGE Age of the head of the household
AGE2/100 Age of the head squared
CHILDREN Indicator equal to 1 if children are part of the household
NUM CHILDREN The number of dependent children in the household
MALE Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is male
WIFE POWER A measure of the realative bargaining power of the wife in the household
MARRIED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is divorced
DIVORCED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is married
WIDOWED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is widowed
SEPARATED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is separated
hold can take advantage of the lower initial interest rate. The PSID includes the
question, “Would you say you definitely will move [in the next couple of years],
probably will move, or are you more uncertain?” Indicator variables for the house-
holds expected probability of moving are included to account for this effect in a
non-parametric way. Household mobility is encoded as four variables (see Table 1.3).
The variable DEFINITELY MOV Eit, which takes a value of one if the household
reports it will move with certainty. If the household reported it would “probably”
move, LIKLEY MOV Eit is set to one. Finally, MAY BE MOV Eit is one when
the household reports its likelihood of moving as “more uncertain”. The baseline
case is if the household reports it will not be moving. Following the literature, an
additional control for mobility is included in the form of an indicator variable if the
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new mortgage is the result of a move, MOV EDit, the idea being that households
which have recently moved will likely move sooner than those who have had a long
tenure in their current home.
Previous research has shown (Campbell and Cocco, 2003) that the risks associated
with variable rate loans are less important to high net worth households. If interest
rates adjust unfavorably, higher wealth households will be able to pay their mort-
gage out of wealth stock if necessary, mitigating the potential for costly downward
adjustments in consumption. The variable NET WORTH is included to account for
this level effect. Additionally, the house size relative to net worth can be important.
Even if a household has a large stock of wealth, if the mortgaged house is expensive
relative to wealth, potential payments in an unfavorable interest rate environment
could be large. The ratio of net worth to principal, NW {HOUSE V ALUEit is in-
cluded as a measure of the possible impact of the mortgage on the wealth of the
household.
The burden of the mortgage on household income is also important. The in-
herent variability of ARM payments will be less of a consideration for high income
households because, in a high interest rate, and consequently mortgage payment
environment, high income households will be less likely to require adjustments to
consumption to meet their mortgage obligations. TOTAL INCOMEit is included
because of this potential influence on mortgage choice. Obviously, a household’s
mortgage obligation relative to its income is also an important consideration. Fam-
ilies with large mortgage payments relative to income will be more likely to require
costly adjustments to consumption in unfavorable interest rate conditions if using an
ARM. To measure and control for this effect, the ratio of annual income to annual
mortgage payments, INCOME{MPMTit is included in the analysis.
If interest rates rise when house prices fall, LOANTOV ALUEit, the ratio of
originating principal to the purchase price of the house, may be an important factor
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when deciding on a type of mortgage. When interest rates are high, a household with
an adjustable rate mortgage may no longer be able to afford mortgage payments.
Selling the home and reducing housing consumption is a potential option for dealing
with this situation. However, if house prices are simultaneously low, the home may
be underwater, and selling the home would not provide enough proceeds to pay off
the remainder of the loan. Mortgages originated with a high loan-to-value ratio are
at higher risk for this situation (Deng, Quigley, and Order, 2000), and ARMs may
be less attractive to homebuyers with a high loan-to-value ratio. To account for any
non-linearities in this relationship, LOAN  TO  V ALUE2it is also included.
One of the primary motivations for refinancing is to lock in low fixed rates. One
recently published popular press personal finance book says, “For those of you eager
to reduce your mortgage costs, today’s record low mortgage rates offer an incredible
deal. As of early 2011, the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has an average interest rate
below 5%” (Orman, 2011). The author mentions only fixed-rate mortgages, and
it is implicit in the statement that, in the author’s opinion, an FRM is the only
type of mortgage one should consider when refinancing. In addition, according to
the Refinance Product Transition Report from Fannie Mae, 86% of refinances since
1990 have been to some type of fixed-rate mortgage product. An indicator variable,
REFINANCEit is included to account for this. There are important reasons why
refinancing might reduce the propensity to choose an ARM. One is that in some
states, refinanced loans are recourse loans, while purchase money loans are not,
increasing the cost of default. As Campbell and Cocco (2003) showed, households
with higher costs of default should be less inclined to choose ARMs. Additionally, if
a household is refinancing, presumably they expect to be in the home long enough
to recoup the costs, so they may be less likely to move in the near future.
Employment is an important consideration in the choice of mortgage contract,
however it’s not clear which contract an employed household will favor. While the
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stable income provided by regular employment might make the lower payments of
an ARM contract relatively more attractive, the more tightly binding liquidity con-
straints of an unemployed household head may push the household toward an ARM
as well, so a higher level of housing consumption can be achieved. Additionally, re-
tirement may have an effect on the choice of an ARM. Given the lower income during
these years, and the expectation of a certain level of non-housing consumption, the
potential for larger mortgage payments may be particulary distasteful. However, the
relatively stable income of these years might make the initial savings of an ARM
appealing. We will be agnostic about the effect of employment on mortgage choice,
however, EMPLOY EDit and RETIREDit will be included to account for their
potential impact on the choice of mortgage contract type.
While the literature has shown little evidence that demographic factors have im-
portant effects on mortgage choice, it is not unreasonable to think that personal
characteristics may influence the choice of an ARM vs. a fixed rate mortgage.
Older borrowers could be less concerned with income variability, and households
with children may be more concerned about risky payments, as they have to care for
a larger family. Several demographic characteristics are added, including AGEit and
AGE2it{100, an indicator variable for the presence of children, CHILDRENit, and
the total number of children in the household. As well, an indicator for sex of the
household head, taking a value of 1 if he is male, and a vector of indicator variables
for marital status are added. The base case for marital status dummies is being a
never-married household head.
Regression Results
Results for the main specification are in Table 1.4. It is important to remember
that the within-estimator is being used and that these values should be interpreted
as changes in within household propensity to choose an ARM with changes in the
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dependent variables. In the most basic model, not including any variables besides
measures of mortgage market participation and fixed effects, coefficients on the PM jit
terms are positive, monotonically increasing, and marginally significant, with values
of 5.3%, 10.2%, and 14.2%, respectively. These indicate that a household is, for
example, 5.3 percentage points more likely to choose an adjustable rate mortgage
when getting their second mortgage than they were on their first mortgage. This is
within the same household. This is an important result, not previously documented.
Previous participation mortgage markets increases the propensity to choose an ad-
justable rate mortgage when taking out a new mortgage. As demonstrated in the
recent financial crisis, household mortgage activity can have significant effects on
the wider economy, and it is important to understand how households make their
home purchase financing decisions, and more broadly, how participation in financial
markets affects household financial decision making.
As discussed earlier, borrower mobility has been shown in both a theoretical
(Brueckner (1994), Campbell and Cocco (2003)) and empirical (Sa-Aadu and Sir-
mans (1995), Brueckner and Follain (1988), Dhillon et al. (1987)) context to influ-
ence the choice of an ARM versus an FRM. It is predicted that higher mobility
should correlate with a higher propensity to choose an ARM. In the second model of
Table 1.4, these measures of borrower mobility are included as MAY BE MOV Eit,
LIKELY MOV Eit, DEFINITELY MOV Eit. We see that the propensity to
choose an ARM is increasing in the self-reported probability of moving, as expected.
To my knowledge, this is the first time that a borrower’s directly reported prob-
ability of moving has been included in an analysis of the mortgage contract type
decision. The magnitudes of the coefficients are similar in size and significance to
those for mortgage market participation. Having recently moved is not an important
factor when considering self-reported likelihood of moving, as shown by the lack of
significance for the coefficient on MOV EDit. Importantly, the pattern for mortgage
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Table 1.4: This table presents regression results for household fixed-effect models of
mortgage choice. Coefficients should be interpreted as the change in the propensity
to choose an adjustable rate mortgage, with a change in the dependent variable,
within a household. For the measures of mortgage market participation, PM j, coef-
ficients represent the change in the propensity to choose an ARM within a household,
relative to that households first mortgage choice. P-values for the coefficients are in
parentheses, and use heteroskedastic robust and clustered standard errors.Table 4 - Fixed Effect Estimation Results, PSID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PM2 0.053 0.0753* 0.0613 0.0642 0.0593 0.0860**
(0.1557) (0.0632) (0.1297) (0.1086) (0.1396) (0.0475)
PM3,4 0.1017* 0.1324** 0.1260** 0.1285** 0.1221** 0.1359**
(0.0669) (0.0256) (0.0346) (0.0289) (0.0381) (0.0266)
PM5+ 0.1419* 0.2063** 0.1938** 0.2010** 0.1888** 0.2194***
(0.0615) (0.0108) (0.0164) (0.0122) (0.0183) (0.0059)
MAYBE MOVE 0.1302*** 0.1324*** 0.1346*** 0.1336*** 0.1202***
(0.0036) (0.003) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0084)
LIKELY MOVE 0.0932 0.1017 0.1005 0.104 0.1505**
(0.2083) (0.1643) (0.1767) (0.1519) (0.0485)
DEFINITELY MOVE 0.1523*** 0.1391** 0.1510*** 0.1409** 0.1924***
(0.006) (0.0116) (0.0061) (0.0112) (0.0005)
MOVED -0.0108 -0.0219 -0.0261 -0.0228 -0.0272
(0.7559) (0.5218) (0.445) (0.5066) (0.4394)
HVAL/INCOME -0.0053 -0.006 -0.0036
(0.4505) (0.4592) (0.7357)
TOTAL INCOME -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.4867) (0.5381) (0.7376)
INCOME/MPMT 0 0 -0.0001***
(0.4137) (0.3708) (0.0001)
NET WORTH 0 0 0
(0.952) (0.6547) (0.9409)
NW/HOUSE VALUE -0.014 -0.0202 -0.0237
(0.5105) (0.3669) (0.2655)
LOAN-TO-VALUE -0.0636
(0.757)
LOAN-TO-VALUE2 0.1352
(0.3274)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.3706 0.391 0.4023 0.3985 0.4033 0.4389
N 4,164 3,920 3,856 3,883 3,856 3,694
Table 4 presents regression results for household fixed-effect models of mortgage choice.  Coefficients should be interpreted as the change 
in the propensity to choose an adjustable rate mortgage, with a change in the dependent variable, within a household.  For the measures of 
mortgage market participation, PMj, coefficients represent the change in the propensity to choose an ARM within a household, relative to 
that households first mortgage choice.  P-values for the coefficients are in parentheses, and use heteroskedastic robust and clustered 
standard errors.
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market participation not only survives the inclusion of these measures of borrower
mobility, but the pattern of increasing propensity to choose an adjustable rate mort-
gage with mortgage market participation is stronger, indicating it is not an artifact
of borrowers with greater mobility generally having more experience in the mortgage
market.
In model 3 of Table 1.4, measures of income and liquidity are included, non of
which significantly affect the results presented in the first two columns. The same
is true in column four, where household net worth and net worth relative to house
value are included, in the absence of income measures. As well, including measures
of income and net worth simultaneously does not affect our main result, that house-
holds are more likely to choose an ARM the more they have participated in mortgage
markets. In the last column, loan-to-value and its value squared are included to mea-
sure how the amount of equity the household has in the home affects the borrowing
decision. As discussed above, we would expect the loan-to-value ratio to have a
negative relationship with the choice of an ARM, which is what we see, however the
coefficient is not statistically significant. Interestingly, the only affordability measure
that shows up significantly in the full model is INCOME{PMTit, though the coef-
ficient of a 100th of a percent is not economically significant. As well, coefficients on
measures of borrower mobility are monotonically increasing in the borrower’s like-
lihood of moving, with values of 12.0%, 15% and 19.2%, respectively, as we would
expect. Finally, inclusion of loan-to-value measures strengthens the results about
mortgage market participation, and we see that the coefficients on PM jit are now all
statistically significant at the 5% level, with values of 8.6%, 13.6% and 21.9% for
j  2, 3  4, and 5 .
Unreported results on the impact of demographic variables on mortgage choice,
included in Table 1.4 as “Demographics”, the head of the household changing from a
woman to a man, as in the case of a marriage, results in a significant increase in the
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propensity to choose an ARM (30%). There is a significant quadratic relationship
between ARM choice propensity and age, with coefficients on AGEit and AGE
2
it{100
of -5.53% and 6.13% respectively. This is a slight “U” shaped pattern, with the
general effect of age decreasing the propensity to choose an ARM. To my knowledge,
the effects of age on mortgage choice have not been documented previously. Finally,
a change in the marital status, relative to a never-married single, to MARRIEDit
increases the propensity to choose an ARM. This is most likely the result of increased
labor market flexibility, on average. A single income household with two people will
have the option for the second, non-working individual, to enter the labor market
in the event of an increase in interest rates. As well, a household’s marital status
changing to SEPARATED has a significant positive coefficient. This could reflect
a more tightly binding liquidity or budget constraints of halving wealth and income
in the event of a divorce, pushing households toward the lower initial payments of
ARMs. This is consistent with Deng, Quigley, and Order (2000) finding “trigger”
events (such as divorce or separation) being important in the default and prepayment
behavior of households. Further investigation of marital status and its interaction
with mortgage choice is left for future work. These results are largely consistent with
previous analysis, which showed that borrower mobility is one of the most important
individual factors on the contract type decision. However, the increased propensity
to choose an ARM with mortgage market participation has not been documented
before. Below, we will discuss some potential explanations for this pattern.
Liquidity and Budget Constraints
We know that wealth and income are both important considerations when choosing
a mortgage. Theory suggests that both factors should have a positive relationship
with the propensity to choose an ARM. While net worth and income are included in
the main specification, we could ask if the observed pattern of increased propensity
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to choose an ARM increasing with participation in the mortgage market can be
explained by income or wealth increasing at the same time. In Table 1.5, regressions
are presented interacting net worth and income terciles for mortgage originators in
the year in which the mortgage was taken out, with number of mortgages. The main
specification is also included for comparison. Looking first at the second column, we
see that though the strength of the pattern is different over the wealth distribution,
the overall pattern holds. Propensity to use an ARM increases the most in the first
and second terciles. In the lowest quantile, the coefficient on PM2it is large, at 13.4%,
and statistically significant. With four or more previous mortgages, the propensity
to choose an adjustable rate mortgage is 25.3 percentage points larger than when
taking out a first mortgage for a household in the lowest net worth tercile. In the top
wealth quantile, the pattern persists, though it is less pronounced and not statistically
significant.
This difference between the top tercile of net worth and the rest of the net worth
distribution seems to have two main drivers. First, households in the top tercile of
net worth, but not in the top tercile of income, do not seem to increase their usage
of ARMs. This can be seen in Table 1.6, Panel (B), by the negative coefficients
on the interaction terms between INC1,2it , which indicates a household belonged to
the first or second tercile of income, but to the top tercile of net worth, and PM jit.
All coefficients are from the same regression with interactions being row variables
interacted with column variables. They are not statistically significant, however the
relatively few number of households with high net worth and lower income does
not allow a very precise estimate. Households with high net worth, but relatively
lower income still have a house value similar to their high net worth peers (roughly
55% of net worth). Since they have similarly large homes but lower income, these
households are much more exposed to negative interest movements. In the event
of interest rates increase, they might have to liquidate assets, or default on the
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Table 1.5: This table gives estimates for changes in within household propensity
to choose an ARM with mortgage market participation interacted with wealth and
income distribution, as well as the main specification for comparison. Standard errors
are in parentheses, with p-values beneath them. The dependent variable, ARMit, is
an indicator variable taking the value one if the household chose an adjustable rate
mortgage. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at
the 1% level.Table 5 - Mortgage Market Partipation and Net Worth and Income
Main Net Worth Income
Dependent Variable ARMit ARMit ARMit
PM2 0.0860** NW1it*PM
2 0.1340*** INC1it*PM
2 0.0395
(0.0434) (0.049) (0.0553)
0.0475 0.0063 0.4759
PM3,4 0.1359** NW1it*PM
3,4 0.1880*** INC1it*PM
3,4 0.1683**
(0.0613) (0.07) (0.0732)
0.0266 0.0073 0.0216
PM5+ 0.2194*** NW1it*PM
5+ 0.2531** INC1it*PM
5+ 0.2022**
(0.0797) (0.1071) (0.1029)
0.0059 0.0182 0.0496
NW2it*PM
2 0.0682 INC2it*PM
2 0.0669
(0.0561) (0.0462)
0.2245 0.1482
NW2it*PM
3,4 0.1162* INC2it*PM
3,4 0.1224*
(0.0658) (0.0649)
0.0775 0.0596
NW2it*PM
5+ 0.2466*** INC2it*PM
5+ 0.2242***
(0.088) (0.0861)
0.0051 0.0093
NW3it*PM
2 0.0127 INC3it*PM
2 0.1398**
(0.0582) (0.0603)
0.8267 0.0206
NW3it*PM
3,4 0.0652 INC3it*PM
3,4 0.1239*
(0.0708) (0.0686)
0.3578 0.071
NW3it*PM
5+ 0.126 INC3it*PM
5+ 0.2122**
(0.0892) (0.0887)
0.158 0.0167
Controls Yes Yes Yes
HH  Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 43.89% 44.60% 44.36%
N 3,694 3,689 3,689
Table 5 gives estimates for changes in within household propensity to choose an ARM with mortgage market participation interacted with wealth 
and income distribution, as well as the main specification for comparison.  Standard errors are in parentheses, with p-values beneath them.  The 
dependent variable, ARMit, is an indicator variable taking the value one if the household chose an adjustable rate mortgage.   * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.24
home. These are outcomes their peers with higher income do not have, and they are
consequently much less inclined to use adjustable rate mortgages.
Second, homeowners who were of an age to buy their first home in the early
1980s, when ARMs were first introduced to the American market and interest rates
increased sharply (peaking at over 16% for 1 year t-bills) seem to have been turned
off to ARMs. It is likely many of them used adjustable rate mortgages (two thirds
of mortgages originated in 1984 were ARMs (Brueckner and Follain, 1988)) and
were financially exposed to the high and variable interest rates of the 1980s. The
interaction of BUY 80, which indicates a homeowner was 25 or older in 1980, and
the PM jit terms also have negative coefficients, indicating that on average these
households do not increase their usage of ARMs. It should be noted that coefficients
are not statistically significant, however the relatively few number of observations
who were buyers in 1980 and are observed with a large number of mortgages, where
the effect should be most pronounced, is relatively small. Importantly, once these
two affects are properly controlled for, the third tercile of wealth exhibits the same
behavior as the other two terciles. The coefficient on the interaction of NW 3it and
PM3it is approximately 0.28, vs 0.33 and 0.30 for PM
3,4
it and PM
2
it, respectively, and
statistically significant at the 5% level. Coefficients are similar in magnitude on
other interaction terms across net worth terciles. Tests of the null hypothesis that
coefficient estimates are equal across net worth quantiles cannot be rejected.
Another possible explanation for the increasing usage of ARMs with mortgage
market participation is more tightly binding liquidity constraints. If lower income
households are moving more frequently to chase jobs, this might be driving the ob-
served results. However, the interaction of income and participation shows a similar
pattern to that of wealth and participation. The second column of Table 1.5 shows
the distribution of income for new mortgagees interacted with the measures of mort-
gage market participation. Column 3 of Table 1.5 shows that for each tercile of
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Table 1.6: This table shows how households with a high net worth differ in their
mortgage choice decisions. It reports point estimates with p-values in parentheses
beneath. Panel (A) displays the net worth regression from Table 1.5, but including
indicator variables for belonging to the second and third terciles of net worth, for
convenience and comparison. Panel (B) repeats the analysis, but includes interaction
terms for households how have a high net worth, but low income, and households
who were likely buying their first home in the early 1980s. Please see the text for a
detailed discussion of these variables and results. * indicates significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Panel A
PM2 PM3,4 PM5+
NW1it 0.1269** 0.1778** 0.2407**
(0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0322)
NW2it 0.0695 0.1152 0.2433***
(0.2382) (0.1014) (0.0075)
NW3it 0.0369 0.0912 0.152
(0.6914) (0.3689) (0.1899)
PM2 PM3,4 PM5+
NW1it 0.1403** 0.2021** 0.3044***
(0.0101) (0.0158) (0.0079)
NW2it 0.0835 0.1461** 0.3283***
(0.1406) (0.0417) (0.0014)
NW3it 0.0464 0.1586 0.2873**
(0.6902) (0.1776) (0.0297)
INC1,2it*NW
3
it -0.0292 -0.1465 -0.1714
(0.8772) (0.4382) (0.3746)
BUY80 0.0044 -0.0268 -0.1772
(0.9736) (0.8683) (0.3257)
Panel B
PM2 PM3,4 PM5+
NW1it 0.1269** 0.1778** 0.2407**
(0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0322)
NW2it 0.0695 152 0.2433***
(0.2382) (0.1014) (0.0075)
NW3it 0.0369 0.0912 0.152
(0.6914) (0.3689) (0.1899)
PM2 PM3,4 PM5+
NW1it 0.1403** 0.2021** 0.3044***
(0.0101) (0.0158) (0.0079)
NW2it 0.0835 0.1461** 0.3283***
(0.1406) (0.0417) (0.0014)
NW3it 0.0464 0.1586 0.2873**
(0.6902) (0.1776) (0.0297)
INC1,2it*NW
3
it -0.0292 -0.1465 -0.1714
(0.8772) (0.4382) (0.3746)
BUY80 0.0044 -0.0268 -0.1772
(0.9736) (0.8683) (0.3257)
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income, participation is positively related to choosing an ARM. Estimates for the
coefficient on PM2it range from 3.95 percentage points in the lowest income quantile
to 14 percentage points higher for the largest income quantile. The propensity to
choose an ARM increases with the number of previous mortgages used, our measure
of mortgage market participation, uniformly across the entire income distribution. If
more tightly binding liquidity constraints for households with more extensive experi-
ence in the mortgage market were driving results, we would not expect the propensity
to choose an ARM to be increasing with participation in the higher quantiles of in-
come.
While the propensity to choose an ARM increases across all three terciles of in-
come and wealth, the cutoffs for being in the third tercile of net worth and income
are $192 thousand and $102 thousand, respectively. It is unlikely that all households
in the top terciles are unconstrained in their optimal choice of housing consumption.
However, we can look at those at the extreme tails of the distribution. Table 1.7
presents results for households we will term “unconstrained.” The first column in-
cludes interactions of an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household has a net worth
greater than $750 thousand, which translates to the 92nd percentile of the wealth dis-
tribution, with the measures of mortgage market participation. The coefficients on
the interaction terms are small and statistically insignificant, indicating that very
wealthy households, which are unlikely to be constrained by wealth, do not behave
differently from the rest of the population. Similar results were obtained for a net
worth of $1.25 million, which translates to the 95th percentile.
The second column of Table 1.7 shows regression results for a comparable analysis
of high income households. Here, the indicator variable in the interaction terms is
1 if total household income is greater than $300 thousand, which translates to the
98th percentile of the wealth distribution. Again, the coefficients on the interaction
terms are small and insignificant, indicating households which are not constrained
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Table 1.7: This table presents fixed-effect regression results for households with net
worth greater than $750,000, income greater than $300,000 and with a net worth
to house value ratio greater than 2.8. These households represent those least likely
to be constrained when they make their housing consumption decision. Column 5
includes interaction terms for mortgage market participation and an indicator if the
respondent moved and the new house is greater than 2.7 times the value of the old
house. The last column interacts an indicator if the respondent indicated they moved
to get a “better”home, either in terms of physical plant or location. Controls, region
effects, time effects and the interaction of time and industry effects are included in all
regressions. Please see the text for a detailed discussion of these variables. P-values
are in parentheses below point estimates. * indicates significane at the 10% level, **
at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.Table 6 - Unconstrained Household Mortgage Choice
Interaction NW > $750K INC > $300K NW/HVAL > 2.8 PMT/INC < 8.5% HI > 2.7 BETTER HOME
Dependent Variable ARMit ARMit ARMit ARMit ARMit ARMit
PM2 0.0895** 0.0897** 0.0835* 0.0815* 0.0681* 0.0932**
(0.0391) (0.0383) (0.0561) (0.065) (0.0946) (0.0364)
PM3,4 0.1340** 0.1367** 0.1289** 0.1354** 0.1025* 0.1525**
(0.0318) (0.0263) (0.036) (0.0277) (0.065) (0.0177)
PM5+ 0.2246*** 0.2256*** 0.2082*** 0.2250*** 0.1946*** 0.2395***
(0.0064) (0.0053) (0.0093) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0028)
INDit*PM
2 -0.084 -0.0742 -0.1425 0.1061 -0.0253 0.0145
(0.4303) (0.5898) (0.2701) (0.2673) (0.6402) (0.7954)
INDit*PM
3,4 0.0337 0.0546 -0.0447 0.0794 0.5494*** -0.0366
(0.6444) (0.6084) (0.7773) (0.33) (0) (0.5419)
INDit*PM
5+ -0.0408 -0.0342 0.0677 0.038 0.8571*** -0.3044***
(0.6984) (0.8169) (0.5762) (0.6599) (0) (0.0024)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 43.99% 43.98% 44.00% 44.18% 47.38% 44.30%
N 3,694 3,694 3,694 3,694 3,694 3,694
Table 6 presents fixed-effect regression results for households with net worth greater than $750,000, income greater than $300,000 and with a net worth to house value ratio greater than 2.8. These households
represent those least likelyto be constrained when they make their housing consumption decision. Column 5 includes interaction terms for mortgage market participation and an indicator if the respondent moved
and the new house is greater than 2.7 times the value of the old house. The last column interacts an indicator if the respondent indicated they moved to get a "better" home, either in terms of physical plant or
location. Controls, region effects, time effects and the interaction of time and industry effects are included in all regressions. Please see the text for a detailed discussion of these variables. P-values are in
parentheses below point estimates.  * indicates significane at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.by incom in their choice of housing co sumpt on do not behave differently than the
rest of the population. They also have an increased propensity to choose ARMs with
increasing participation in mortgage markets.
Columns three and four of Table 1.7 present regressions for ratios of wealth to
house value and mortgage payments to income, respectively. In column three, an in-
dicator variable taking a value of 1 if the ratio of net worth to house value is greater
than 2.7, which corresponds to the 90th percentile, is interacted with the number
of previous mortgages, as before. The coefficients on the interaction terms are not
statistically significant and are monotonically increasing. These unconstrained house-
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holds exhibit the same pattern of increasing usage of ARMs with mortgage market
participation, but potentially at a different rate, as the relatively more constrained
households. Column four interaction terms include an indicator variable equal to 1
if the ratio of housing expenses, defined to be the sum of mortgage payments, real
estate taxes, and homeowners insurance, to the mean of 5 year lagged income is less
than 10.8%, corresponding to the 15th percentile of the distribution of this ratio.
Mortgage underwriting standards mandate that the ratio of housing costs to income
should be 28% or less. Households with relatively low ratios of housing expense to
income could most likely afford a larger home and were probably unconstrained in
their choice of housing consumption. Coefficients on the interaction terms are not
statistically significant. Moreover, if we add coefficients on interaction terms and
raw mortgage market participation variables, we get 18.75%, 21.5% and 26.3% for
2, 3-4 and 5+ previous mortgages, respectively, showing increasing usage of ARMs
with mortgage market participation for these unconstrained households as well, and
demonstrating this phenomenon is not confined to households with binding budget
or liquidity constraints.
The final two columns of Table 1.7 investigate the propensity of households who
are significantly increasing their housing consumption in terms of value of home,
and also those who moved to get a better home, either in terms of physical plant or
location. Column 5 interacts an indicator variable, HIit, equal to 1 if the value of
the household’s new home is 3.1 (90th percentile) times or more than the value of its
previous home. Presumably, households with large increases in housing consumption
are more likely to be constrained, and potentially more likely to use ARMs as result.
We find that this is the case, with those who increase their housing consumption
significantly having a much higher propensity to choose ARMs. Importantly, though,
we see the propensity to choose ARMs increasing in mortgage market participation
for both those with significantly larger housing consumption and those with less
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extreme changes in consumption. Results for the 50th and 75th percentiles are similar.
Following a similar argument to that for column 5, if households are expanding
their housing consumption immediately upon being able to afford a larger or better
home, and bumping into budget or liquidity constraints as a result, we would expect
those who report they moved to get a larger, better or more optimally located home
to be driving the results presented above. In column 6, an indicator variable taking
the value of 1 if the household responds that they moved to get a better house,
either in terms of physical characteristics of the home, or location. The PSID asks
the question “Why did you move?” if the household responded that they moved.
Choices included changing jobs, moving closer to work, responses to involuntary
events, and marriage. Respondents could also reply, “expansion of housing: more
space; more rent; better place” or “neighborhood related: better neighborhood; go
to school; to be closer to friends/relatives.” If the respondent gave either of these
answers, the variable BETTER HOMEit was assigned a value of 1. Looking at
the coefficients in column 6, we see that the interaction terms are small and not
significant for all but the last term. More importantly, the documented phenomenon
of increasing propensity to choose an adjustable rate contract with mortgage market
participation persists for those who are refinancing or moving for other reasons.
Similar results were obtained for either response alone, and for a restricted sample
which included only households which moved.
We might also be concerned that households living in areas with increasing hous-
ing prices, such as the Southwest and California, are being priced out of fixed rate
contracts. The sample includes a time period of rapid growth in house prices across
the country. If this is the case, we would expect households not in these high growth
areas to exhibit different behavior. Table 1.8 presents coefficient estimates for two
models. In column 1, an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the state in which
the household resides has seen home prices increase by 40% or more in the previous
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five years, as calculated from the Federal Housing Finance Association’s state level
housing price indexes. This translates to an approximately 7% per year increase,
on average. While it seems that households in these states increase their usage of
ARMs more rapidly, we also see that those not in high priced states exhibit the same
behavior, refuting the argument that households are being priced out of FRMs by
rising home prices. Similar results were obtained for 50% (8.5% annualized) growth
in prices over 5 years. Additionally, the second column presents our main specifica-
tion, restricted to years after 2005, a period marked by falling home prices. We see
the pattern persists, also inconsistent with rising home prices, inducing homeowners
to use lower cost ARMs.
The wealth and income results, and those pertaining to financial constraints, are
inconsistent with budget or liquidity constraints driving the increased usage of ARMs
with participation in mortgage markets. However, it could be the volatility of income
that matters, and not the level. This is a possibility discussed below.
Income Volatility
Income volatility should be one of the most important predictors of ARM choice
propensity. As Campbell and Cocco (2003) showed, adjustable rate contracts should
be less appealing for households with a large volatility of income, as it is more likely
that periods of high interest rates and low income will coincide. It could be that
as households participate in mortgage markets, their incomes become more stable.
If this is the case, we would expect the trend of increased propensity to choose an
ARM with mortgage market participation to disappear for households with unstable
income. That is, if a household has an unstable income, we should not see the pattern
of increasing usage of ARMs with more extensive participation in mortgage markets.
In a regression context, this is equivalent to saying the coefficients on our measures
of mortgage market participation should not be positive or increasing for households
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Table 1.8: This table presents results for high housing price growth areas and a
restriction of the sample period to post 2005, when real estate values fell across
the country. The indicator variable in the first column indicates 5 year real estate
price growth of 40% or higher. Please see the text for a detailed discussion of these
variables. P-values are in parentheses below point estimates. * indicates significane
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Table 7 - Housing Prices
Interaction
5-yr Price 
Growth > 40% After 2005
Dependent Variable ARMit ARMit
PM2 0.0561 0.1420**
(0.205) (0.0177)
PM3,4 0.1082* 0.2373***
(0.0951) (0.0051)
PM5+ 0.1820** 0.3162***
(0.0351) (0.0011)
INDit*PM
2 0.0874*
(0.0644)
INDit*PM
3,4 0.0572
(0.1755)
INDit*PM
5+ 0.1147
(0.1136)
Controls Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time*Industry FE Yes Yes
R2 44.38% 50.72%
N 3,694 2,883
Table 7 presents results for high housing price growth areas and a restriction of the 
sample period to post 2005, when real estate values fell across the country.  The 
indicator variable in the first column indicates 5 year real estate price growth of 40% or 
higher.  Please see the text for a detailed discussion of these variables.  P-values are in 
parentheses below point estimates.  * indicates significane at the 10% level, ** at the 
5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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with high volatility of income growth. Results are reported in Table 1.9. In col-
umn 2, results are shown using the standard deviation of trailing earnings growth
for the previous five years. An indicator variable, IV Lit for being in the top quintile
of income growth volatility in a year when a mortgage is taken out, is interacted
with the measures of mortgage market participation. Here L  HIGH IV . If the
null hypothesis that household income is becoming more stable with time, reducing
the income risk of ARMs, is true, then increasing propensity to choose an ARM
with mortgage market participation is expected to disappear among those with high
income volatility. That is, the coefficients on the interaction terms should be nega-
tive and significantly different from zero. Only one of these coefficients is negative
and none are significant, showing that the propensity to choose an ARM increases
with participation in mortgage markets even for high income volatility households.
This contradicts the hypothesis that incomes become more stable simultaneously as
mortgage market participation increases. Results are qualitatively unchanged when
redefining the high income volatility households as the top 10% or top 30% of the
income growth volatility distribution.
Alternatively, we could look at the low end of the distribution of income volatility.
If households with stable incomes are driving results, we would expect the pattern of
increased propensity to choose an ARM to disappear for those not in the lower part
of the income volatility distribution. That is, coefficients on the mortgage market
participation indicators should not increase monotonically as j increases. In column
3 of Table 1.9, the same measure of income growth volatility is used, however now
an indicator variable is added if the income volatility is in the lowest 30% of the
distribution (L  LOW IV ). We lose some power due to observation attrition, but
we see the coefficients on the interaction terms are close to zero and not statistically
significant, while the coefficients on the PM jit terms are very similar in magnitude
and significance to previous results. This shows that these households do not behave
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Table 1.9: This table shows regression results investigating income volatility as a
driver for the result that the propensity to choose an adjustable rate mortgage in-
creases with previous participation in mortgage markets. The first column presents
the main result for comparison, while the second separates out those households in
the highest quintile of income volatility. The third column separates out households
in the lowest quintile of income volatility and the final column separates out house-
holds in the top quintile of income trend. Please see the text for a detailed discussion
of these variables. P-values are in parentheses below point estimates. * indicates sig-
nificane at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1%
level. Table 6 - Income Volatility
Main Lagged IV: High Lagged IV: Low IV Time Trend
ARMit ARMit ARMit ARMit
PM2 0.0860** 0.0123 0.0197 0.0038
0.0475 0.7996 0.7267 0.9417
PM3,4 0.1359** 0.0869 0.0823 0.0818
0.0266 0.2141 0.2567 0.271
PM5+ 0.2194*** 0.1657* 0.1609* 0.1936**
0.0059 0.0675 0.0834 0.0464
IVLit*PM
2 0.1025 0.0292 0.1800**
0.1577 0.6165 0.0166
IVLit*PM
3,4 -0.0894 -0.0392 0.0451
0.1232 0.2614 0.4525
IVLit*PM
5+ 0.1177 -0.0028 -0.0204
0.1763 0.9582 0.7912
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 43.89% 48.38% 48.38% 48.94%
N 3,694 2,889 2,889 2,893
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markedly different from those with higher income volatility, and increasing income
stability with participation in mortgage markets is not causing the observed increase
in propensity to use ARMs. Results are qualitatively similar if the definition of low
income volatility is changed to the lowest 20% of the distribution.
Another measure of cash flow volatility is the OLS regression coefficient of income
growth on time, βINC . This variable has the advantage of measuring directionality
of income changes. Presumably households with recent growth in income will ex-
pect similar growth in the future, and will be in a better position to weather any
unfavorable interest rate environments. Households with large and positive income
growth should be more apt to choose an ARM, as they expect future income growth
to be positive as well. If income growth is more likely to be positive at the same time
as mortgage market participation increases, we would see the observed increases in
ARM choice propensity. Assigning the value of IV Lit , L  βINC to be one when a
household’s βINC is in the top quintile of all households and interacting IV
L
it with
our PM jit variables, we include these in the same manner as before. Looking at the
fourth column of Table 1.9, we see the propensity to choose an ARM is unchanged
for households with a high βINC , except for early in the experience with mortgage
markets, with coefficients on the interaction terms ranging from 18% and significant
at the 5% level for one previous mortgage, to -2% and not significant for four or more
previous mortgages. We see that for the rest of the sample, coefficients on mortgage
market participation are largely unchanged, contrary to the hypothesis that large
income growth is driving this phenomenon.
Confounding
The potential for confounding effects of other variables is present in any regression
analysis. I have tried in this section to address the largest potential confounding
effect in the context of this study: households making housing decisions for non-
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housing related reason. In this section, I will be investigating if households who are
potentially removing equity from their home in order to pay for extreme expenses
might be driving the overall result that the propensity to choose and adjustable rate
mortgage increases with participation in mortgage markets.
One of the primary reasons a household might extract equity is because it is an
entrepreneurial one in which home equity is required to invest in the “family” busi-
ness. In the PSID, data are obtained indicating weather the head of the household
is self employed. An indicator variable (SELFEMP t) if the household head is self
employed is interacted with the measures of mortgage market participation. Results
are presented in the first column of Table 1.10. We see that self employed households
may not increase their usage of ARMs as soon as other households, as indicated by
the marginally significant coefficient of -13.75% on the interaction with PM2, but
importantly, this effect is not driving the general result. As well, self employed seem
to exhibit the same pattern, with the possible exception discussed above.
A second reason a household might extract equity is that a child or children
might be attending, or about to attend, college. The PSID does not provide data
exactly covering if dependents are in college, but we can see the age of the youngest
child. I condition on the youngest child in the household being over 15 with the idea
that if the youngest child is 15, either she will soon be in college and any siblings
will either be in college, or be in college in the near future as well. Results are
presented in column 2 of Table 1.10. An indicator variable taking a value of one if the
youngest child is over 15 (CHILD15) is interacted with measures of mortgage market
participation. Coefficients on the interacted terms are universally insignificant, and
the main pattern continues to hold. This analysis was repeated for the youngest
childe being older than 16 and 17, with similar outcomes. Results are consistent
with children nearing, or in, college not confounding the main result.
The PSID also directly measures school expenses. This could be for a child’s
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college tuition, as above, or for a household head’s own education. Creating an
indicator for high school expenses relative to income (SEI0.2), which takes a value of
one if school expenses exceed 20% of total household income, interactions with the
mortgage market participation variables are created. Column 3 of Table 1.10 presents
results. Coefficients on interaction terms are universally statistically insignificant,
though the magnitude on SEI0.2 interacted with PM2 is relatively high, suggesting
households might be switching to ARMs early in their dealings with the mortgage
market. Importantly, however, the general result that households have an increased
propensity to use ARMs with mortgage market participation is not significantly
influenced by accounting for high school expense.
Household heads who spend a large amount of time away from work due to
illness or unemployment might pull equity out of the home to pay for daily expenses.
Additionally, they might find it more difficult to qualify for a loan, pushing them
toward adjustable rate products. The PSID includes data on time spent away from
work due to illness or unemployment, and indicator variables are created taking a
value of one of the household head was away from work for at least a month in the
previous year. The last two columns of Table 1.10 present results where an indicator
variable for a large amount of time spent ill (ILLTIME30) or spent unemployed
(UEMPTIME30) is interacted with measures of mortgage market participation.
Results are similar in both cases, with significant interaction terms with PM2 in both
cases, and with PM3,4 in the case of UEMPTIME30. This indicates households
may be pushed to ARMs to some degree by the difficulties of unemployment, whether
for medical reasons or otherwise. It is important to note, however, that the main
results continue to hold, if with a slightly lower level significance for PM2 and PM3,4
than before. This is consistent with unexpected expense having an effect on housing
choices, but not driving the main result that households increase their usage of
adjustable rate mortgages as the participate in the mortgage market.
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Table 1.10: This table shows regression results investigating potentially confounding
effects due to households potentially removing equity from their home in order to
pay for certain extreme expenses. This includes self-employment (SELFEMP t),
children in or soon to be in college (CHILD15), large school expenses relative to
income (SEI0.2), a large amount of time spent ill and unable to work (ILLTIME30)
or a large amount of time spent unemployed (UEMPTIME30). Indicator variable
interacted with measures of mortgage market participation is indicated at the top of
each column. Please see the text for a detailed discussion of these variables. P-values
are in parentheses below point estimates. * indicates significane at the 10% level, **
at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
SELF EMPt CHILD15 SEI0.2 ILLTIME30 UEMPTIME30
PM2 0.1052** 0.0865** 0.0843* 0.0658 0.0624
(0.0355) (0.0488) (0.0553) (0.1644) (0.1794)
PM3,4 0.1649** 0.1329** 0.1357** 0.1324* 0.1178*
(0.0215) (0.0314) (0.0281) (0.0502) (0.077)
PM5+ 0.2438*** 0.2244*** 0.2205*** 0.2158*** 0.2050**
(0.006) (0.0052) (0.0062) (0.0096) (0.0126)
INDit*PM
2 -0.1375* 0.0188 0.2797 0.1635** 0.1730**
(0.0971) (0.8566) (0.1341) (0.0458) (0.0219)
INDit*PM
3,4 0.0455 0.0417 -0.0856 0.0781 0.1247*
(0.5423) (0.5058) (0.5142) (0.3291) (0.0782)
INDit*PM
5+ 0.1285 -0.0889 -0.0761 0.0704 -            
(0.3362) (0.1777) (0.5894) (0.3974) -            
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 45.9% 44.1% 44.1% 44.5% 44.3%
N 3,313       3,694       3,665      3,694      3,694        
Composition
It is possible that households who reach 5 or more mortgages in the sample period
are systematically different than households who only reach 3 or 4 mortgages, who
may in turn differ significantly from households who reach only 2 mortgages in the
sample. Table 1.11 presents means for relevant variables by year, maximum num-
ber of mortgage reached in the sample, and number of mortgages reached by each
year. There appear to be few differences across categories. Table 1.12 presents major
financial and demographic variables across different max mortgage groups (MM2,
MM3,4 and MM5 ), with equal number of mortgages, across time. That is, I com-
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pared MM2 and MM3,4, where current number of mortgages was 2, at each year
from 1999-2009. I did the same for current mortgages of 3 or 4 and compared MM3,4
and MM5 . Comparing means for MM2 and MM3,4 indicates few differences over-
all. Possibly lower income for the MM2 group, but the MM2 group has the same, or
perhaps slightly higher, income/housing expense ratio, with some years being higher
and some years lower. The other potential difference is the MM2 group is less likely
to have a male head. All these considerations are controlled for in the regression and
based on this type of summary statistic there appears to be little difference. Medians
show a similar pattern. Comparing MM3,4 and MM5 , each with 3 or 4 mortgages,
across years shows little systematic difference. Some years MM3,4 has higher income
or net worth and other years MM5  has higher values for these variables. When
not conditioning on comparing groups with the same number of mortgages, MM2
seems to have systematically lower income and net worth, but this makes sense as
they never reach more than 2 mortgages and are likely to be earlier in their life cycle,
with less chance for wealth accumulation and income growth.
In Table ??, Panel (A) presents the distribution of observations over the different
maximum mortgages categories, by year. We see that, overall, the distribution is
fairly constant. Households belonging to MM2 tend to comprise approximately 30%
of the sample in any given year, while MM3,4 and MM5  households account for
about 55% and just under 20%, respectively. This shows that there are not truncation
issues, with most of the MM2 households clustering near the end of the sample, but
in fact the distribution across years is roughly stable. Panel (B) of Table 1.12 presents
the distribution of maximum mortgage categories across industry of employment for
the head of the household. In general, the distribution is relatively consistent across
MM2, MM3,4 and MM5 ). Notable exceptions are that MM2 households seem to
be have a lower percentage of households in manufacturing and a higher percentage of
households in retail, relative to the other categories. However, they are more similar
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Table 1.11: This table presents means for relevant financial, economic and demo-
graphic variables separated by year, maximum number of mortgages reached in the
sample, and the mortgages reached at each point in time. Panel (A) compares house-
holds who achieve a maximum of 2 mortgages with those who reach 3 or 4 mortgages,
while Panel (B) compares households who achieve a maximum of 3 or 4 mortgages
with those achieve a maximum of 5 or more mortgages.
Panel A: Means - MM2-MM3,4, Total Mortgages 2
MM = 2 MM = 3,4 MM = 2 MM = 3,4 MM = 2 MM = 3,4 MM = 2 MM = 3,4 MM = 2 MM = 3,4 MM = 2 MM = 3,4
MAYBE MOVE 0.98          0.85         0.81          0.88         0.88           0.92           0.85           0.88           0.76           0.86           0.78           -            
LIKELY MOVE 0.01          -          -            -           0.02           0.06           0.01           0.06           0.08           0.05           0.06           -            
DEFINITELY MOVE -           0.12         0.06          0.12         0.06           0.02           0.05           0.06           0.12           0.05           0.12           -            
MOVED 0.57          0.54         0.49          0.65         0.37           0.34           0.46           0.40           0.50           0.46           0.50           -            
REFINANCE 0.30          0.31         0.21          0.24         0.70           0.74           0.45           0.56           0.46           0.52           0.45           -            
CHILDREN 0.29          0.53         0.62          0.61         0.44           0.54           0.57           0.52           0.50           0.67           0.44           -            
TOTAL INCOME 76.27        83.57       55.23        119.00     79.93         87.12         78.69         100.67       75.07         101.63       96.64         -            
LOAN-TO-VALUE 0.60          0.83         0.77          0.68         0.69           0.67           0.63           0.58           0.73           0.69           0.73           -            
LOAN-TO-VALUE2 0.42          0.73         0.64          0.51         0.53           0.49           0.45           0.36           0.58           0.52           0.62           -            
MALE 0.65          0.69         0.87          0.95         0.60           0.71           0.78           0.94           0.77           0.83           0.76           -            
INCOME/MPMT 10.66        6.17         6.31          8.43         6.84           7.07           8.62           6.01           6.41           5.83           9.23           -            
NET WORTH 140.44      216.21     179.36      173.41     167.61       140.32       234.50       248.05       134.18       230.23       219.01       -            
NW/HOUSE VALUE 0.82          1.14         0.66          0.80         0.80           0.67           0.84           0.75           0.57           0.63           0.88           -            
AGE 49.86        41.29       47.13        44.53       44.92         39.07         42.93         39.87         38.40         37.87         43.49         -            
AGE2/100 25.97        17.82       23.94        20.61       21.96         16.34         20.23         17.09         15.80         15.17         20.89         -            
NUM CHILDREN 0.55          0.91         1.17          1.32         0.73           1.03           0.99           1.02           0.98           1.12           0.81           -            
EMPLOYED 0.70          0.91         0.66          0.89         0.89           0.88           0.81           0.87           0.85           0.95           0.81           -            
RETIRED 0.20          0.09         0.28          -           0.09           0.06           0.15           0.12           0.06           0.03           0.09           -            
DIVORCED 0.33          0.27         0.15          -           0.28           0.16           0.14           0.05           0.19           0.13           0.18           -            
WIDOWED 0.05          0.06         0.13          0.05         0.10           -            0.09           0.06           0.01           0.06           0.06           -            
MARRIED 0.60          0.53         0.72          0.95         0.46           0.67           0.67           0.85           0.61           0.66           0.62           -            
SEPARATED -           -          -            -           -            0.00           0.02           -            0.01           0.02           0.01           -            
2005 2007 20091999 2001 2003
Panel B: Means - MM3,4-MM5 , Total Mortgages 3 or 4
MM = 3,4 MM = 5+ MM = 3,4 MM = 5+ MM = 3,4 MM = 5+ MM = 3,4 MM = 5+ MM = 3,4 MM = 5+ MM = 3,4 MM = 5+
MAYBE MOVE 0.92          0.81         0.96          0.81         0.91           0.82           0.90           0.92           0.83           0.81           0.85           -            
LIKELY MOVE -           0.03         -            0.05         0.01           0.02           0.03           -            0.04           0.06           0.03           -            
DEFINITELY MOVE -           0.09         0.04          0.06         0.04           0.04           0.05           0.08           0.07           0.05           0.05           -            
MOVED 0.30          0.42         0.55          0.54         0.27           0.21           0.37           0.17           0.39           0.39           0.26           -            
REFINANCE 0.77          0.58         0.50          0.30         0.75           0.86           0.61           0.69           0.53           0.58           0.67           -            
CHILDREN 0.39          0.47         0.54          0.49         0.38           0.35           0.44           0.46           0.46           0.39           0.54           -            
TOTAL INCOME 126.38      119.58     102.28      115.40     124.23       141.82       113.40       111.24       97.93         109.78       110.37       -            
LOAN-TO-VALUE 0.62          0.76         0.64          0.54         0.57           0.59           0.57           0.57           0.61           0.59           0.69           -            
LOAN-TO-VALUE2 0.44          0.64         0.45          0.35         0.37           0.39           0.38           0.36           0.43           0.40           0.57           -            
MALE 0.95          0.78         0.84          1.00         0.88           0.90           0.88           1.00           0.86           0.82           0.87           -            
INCOME/MPMT 8.52          8.29         7.91          8.24         9.23           7.62           8.02           6.96           7.79           7.14           8.32           -            
NET WORTH 413.64      225.49     227.15      363.68     438.45       479.31       413.11       250.63       297.69       391.96       316.63       -            
NW/HOUSE VALUE 1.39          1.11         0.92          1.01         1.33           1.13           1.09           0.77           0.88           0.99           1.04           -            
AGE 49.40        44.50       47.04        45.86       51.27         50.13         46.96         49.59         47.35         52.49         47.45         -            
AGE2/100 25.45        20.25       23.04        22.06       27.41         26.04         23.20         25.46         23.80         29.22         24.00         -            
NUM CHILDREN 0.75          0.99         1.02          0.99         0.71           0.74           0.84           0.74           0.90           0.84           0.99           -            
EMPLOYED 0.89          0.91         0.83          0.72         0.86           0.91           0.90           0.80           0.91           0.78           0.83           -            
RETIRED 0.03          0.06         0.17          0.28         0.10           0.07           0.06           0.11           0.05           0.19           0.11           -            
DIVORCED 0.11          0.10         0.19          -           0.11           0.15           0.15           -            0.16           0.18           0.11           -            
WIDOWED 0.08          -          0.05          -           0.05           -            0.01           -            0.00           0.00           0.03           -            
MARRIED 0.75          0.72         0.69          1.00         0.80           0.80           0.73           1.00           0.74           0.75           0.79           -            
SEPARATED -           0.02         0.06          -           0.00           -            0.02           -            0.02           0.04           0.02           -            
20092005 20071999 2001 2003
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Table 1.12: This table presents, in panel (A), the distribution of observations by year,
and in (B), the employment industry across the different categories of maximum
number of mortgages reached in the sample. There seems to be little difference
across the different categories in the distribution of estimation observations by year.
Additionally, there is little systematic variation in in industry of employment across
maximum mortgage groups. See the text for a more detailed discussion.
Panel A
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
2 Mortgages 25.79% 34.43% 23.56% 30.50% 28.72% 29.12%
3-4 Mortgages 54.21% 51.64% 59.73% 51.88% 45.30% 45.47%
5+ Mortgages 20.00% 13.93% 16.71% 17.62% 25.99% 25.41%
Panel B
MM2 MM3,4 MM5+     Total
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, 2.2% 3.0% 0.8% 2.3%
Mining 1.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7%
Utilities 0.4% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3%
Construction 9.0% 9.4% 8.9% 9.2%
Manufacturing 15.3% 19.0% 19.3% 18.0%
Wholesale Trade 4.6% 3.9% 3.1% 3.9%
Retail Trade 7.8% 6.0% 3.8% 6.0%
Transportation and Warehousing 3.2% 4.7% 4.0% 4.1%
Information 3.1% 3.4% 4.0% 3.5%
Finance and Insurance 5.3% 5.1% 6.8% 5.5%
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 2.7% 1.6% 3.0% 2.2%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 8.1% 6.8% 8.8% 7.6%
Management, Administrative and Support 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 1.6%
Educational Services 7.0% 6.5% 7.6% 6.9%
Health Care and Social Assistance 7.4% 8.0% 7.8% 7.8%
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 1.5% 1.5% 1.8% 1.6%
Accommodations and Food Services 5.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.5%
Other Services 3.5% 3.1% 2.0% 2.9%
Public Administration and Active 10.9% 10.3% 10.1% 10.4%
to MM5  in their percentages represented in real estate and rental and leasing, and
professional, scientific and technical services. In general, there is little to suggest a
systematic difference between different groups.
Finally, if households who take out more mortgages are simply more inclined to
use adjustable rate mortgages, this compositional effect could produce the observed
pattern of increasing propensity to choose an adjustable rate mortgage with mortgage
market participation when the different groups are aggregated in the same specifi-
cation. To test if this is the case, an indicator variable for the maximum number
of mortgages the household reaches in the sample period is created. The variables
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MM2i , MM
3,4
i and MM
5 
i take values of one if the maximum number of mortgages
for the household is 2, 3 or 4, or 5 or more, respectively. These are then interacted
with the measures of mortgage market participation. Table 1.13 presents relevant
coefficient estimates. We see that the coefficient on the PM2 interaction term for
MM2i  1 is positive, as we would expect, however not significant. The coefficients
on PM2 and PM3,4 are positive and increasing for MM3,4i  1, with values of 16.2%
and 17.9%. With a p-value of 9.3%, an F-test of the null hypothesis that coefficients
on MM2i  PM
2 and MM3,4i  PM
2 are equal cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
The coefficients for MM5 i  1 are also positive and increasing, with values of 25.4%
and 31.9%. An F-test of the hypothesis that coefficients on MM3,4i  PM
3,4 and
MM5 i  PM
3,4 are equal is also not rejected, and has a p-value of 45.2%. While
there could be differences across groups, we see propensity to choose an ARM in-
creasing in mortgage market participation for all categories. Statistical significance
in the PM2 variable might be due to the effects of the MM3,4 group, but comparing
the MM3,4 and MM5  groups, estimates on PM3,4 are positive and significant for
both MM3,4 and MM5  groups, which is consistent with the overall results.
Learning & Financial Sophistication
When calibrating their model to 1986-2001 interest rate data, Campbell and Cocco
(2003) find that nominal ARMs dominate nominal FRMs in all of their simulations.
It should be said that the authors do not stress this point, but it is suggestive
that ARMs may be better, in a household welfare sense, than many people think.
Additionally, if we look at the ex post costs of adjustable rate mortgages during the
same time period, we see that ARMs would have saved homeowners a significant
amount of money. Panel (A) of Table 1.14 shows the average relative interest costs
at multiple horizons from 1986 to the most recent year available. Mortgage interest
rate data comes from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporations (Freddie Macs)
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Table 1.13: This table presents coefficient estimates for mortgage market partic-
ipation measures by category of maximum number of mortgages obtained by the
household in the sample period. MM j indicates that the household used a maxi-
mum of j mortgages during the sample period. All coefficients are from the same
regression. Tests of equality across categories are included. P-values are in paren-
theses below point estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Interaction
Dependent Variable PM2 PM3,4 PM5+
MM2 0.0441 - -
(0.3572) - -
MM3,4 0.1620** 0.1788** -
(0.0128) (0.0122) -
MM5+ - 0.2538*** 0.3189***
- (0.0037) (0.0007)
Test of MM2*PM2 = MM3,4*PM2
F(1, 2997) = 2.82
P-value = 0.0930
Test of MM3,4*PM3,4 = MM5+*PM34
F(1, 2997) = 0.57
P-value = 0.4522
Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS). Rates are taken from a survey of the
largest mortgage lenders and are quoted offers, not closed deals. Adjustable rates
use the initial rate published in the PMMS for the first adjustment period, and then
the one year treasury yield together with the PMMS published margin. The values
in the table are the annual average differences in the cost of an FRM relative to
an ARM initiated in the same month for the given horizon. With this definition,
positive values indicate FRMs were ex-post more expensive. At a 5 year horizon,
there are only 3 years between 1986 and 2011 in which actual 5 year interest costs
were higher for an adjustable rate mortgage versus a fixed rate mortgage, and in
these cases the difference was on the order of 1-2%. In contrast, the advantages can
be quite large. An individual who took out a fixed rate loan in 2000 would have
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paid 30% more in the first five years of the loan than if an ARM had been chosen.
This is during a time when more than 50% of households had a housing tenure of 6
years or less, according to the National Association of Realtors. We should also take
note of the difference in total interest costs, which are even larger than for overall
payments, indicating that not only would homeowners have paid less, they would
have paid down principal faster.
Table 1.14 presents results for ex-post realized payments, however it is the ex-
pected present value of payments that is relevant to homeowners. Tucker (1991)
simulated interest rate paths out to 30 years from the time of mortgage origi-
nation, and compared the present value of total FRM costs to total ARM costs
at different holding periods. The 1-year constant maturity T-bill rate was mod-
eled as rTBt  r
TB
t1   σTB  t, where σTB is the one year standard deviation of
∆rTBt  r
TB
t  r
TB
t1 and t is a normal random variable with a mean of zero and
variance of one. The parameter σTB was estimated using date from 1974 to 1989.
He calculated the present value of FRM and ARM payments for different holding
periods using this simulated interest rate process for the 50 months from January
of 1985 through February of 1989. The present value of paying off the remaining
principal at the end of the holding period is included in the calculation. Tucker
found that for a discount rate of 4% and holding periods of less than 19 years, the
expected present value of FRM payments exceeded the expected present value of
ARM payments. For discount rates larger than 8%, the expected present value of
fixed rate mortgage payments was larger for all holding periods.
One concern with Tucker’s study is the model of interest rate used. In reality,
interest rate processes are more stable and exhibit excess kurtosis than a random walk
with a normal disturbance. Supplementing Tucker (1991), two different interest rate
simulations were performed. The first model is a random walk with a disturbance
which has a T-distribution. The model used is rTBt  r
TB
t1   σTB  ηt, where σTB
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Table 1.14: Numbers represent the percentage difference in mortgage costs for a
fixed rate mortgage relative to the costs of an adjustable rate mortgage initiated
in the same month. With this definition, a value of 10% indicates ex post costs of
an FRM were 10% more than for an ARM. Initial interest rates come from Freddie
Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey, which represents the average rates offered
to mortgage applicants. ARM rates in the PMMS are indexed to short term treasury
rates, so yields from the Federal Reserve Board are used to calculate expected interest
costs for ARMs. Panel (A) summarizes actual costs since 1986, while Panel (B)
summarizes expected costs over the same period.
Panel A - Actual Differences in Mortgage Payments
Horizon 3 5 7 10
Difference Paid
Mean 10.7% 9.6% 10.9% 13.8%
Median 8.5% 6.7% 10.0% 14.5%
Interest Difference
Mean 17.7% 15.1% 16.8% 21.5%
Median 11.7% 9.7% 16.4% 21.5%
Panel B - Expected Differences in Mortgage Payments
Horizon 3 5 7 10
Difference Paid
Mean 2.2% -3.3% -6.3% -8.8%
Median 1.0% -3.6% -6.9% -9.5%
Interest Difference
Mean 3.8% -4.4% -8.5% -11.8%
Median 1.4% -4.7% -9.5% -12.9%
is now the standard deviation of monthly changes, ∆rTBt  r
TB
t  r
TB
t1, and ηt is
a random variable following a T distribution with kurtosis to match that of the
∆rTBt process and scaled to have a mean of zero and variance of one. The second
simulation, following Brenner et al. (1996), models the change in interest rate as
∆rTBt  α βr
TB
t1 t and models the volatility of the interest rate as a GARCH(1,1)
process, where Et1p
2
t q  σ
2
t  a0  a1 
2
t1  bσ
2
t1. Parameters were estimated
using the 1-year constant maturity T-bill rate from 1960 through 2011. Simulations
were performed for monthly fixed and adjustable mortgage rates taken from Freddie
Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey from 1986 through 2011. Present values
were calculated for initial principal of $100,000 and discount rates of 4%, 6%, 8%,
and 10%. The difference in the present value of payments for FRMs and ARMs
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Figure 4 − PV Difference in Costs for FRM vs. ARM
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Figure 4 shows the relative costs of ARMs and FRMs. It plots the difference PV(cost of FRM) - PV(cost of ARM) against the
holding period in years. Circles indicate a GARCH(1,1) based simulation. A GARCH(1,1) model for monthly changes in the
1-year tbill rate was estimated using data from 1960 through 2011, following the methodology discussed in Brenner et. al (1996).
For each month between January of 1986 and December of 2011, 100 simulations of the interest rate process were generated, and
the present value of ARM costs for holding periods from 1 to 30 years was calculated. These values were then compared to the
present value of an FRM originated in the same month. As a comparison, following Tucker (1991), simulations based on the
random walk model rTBt = r
TB
t−1 + σTB × ηt, where σTB, is the monthly standard deviation of the 1-year Treasury Bill rate. These
simulations are indicated with square points.
Figure 1.4: This graph shows the relative costs of ARMs and FRMs. It plots
the present value (PV) of the difference E(cost of FRM) - E(cost of ARM) against
the holding period in years. Circles indicate a GARCH(1,1) based simulation. A
GARCH(1,1) model for monthly changes in the 1-year tbill rate w s estimat d us-
ing data from 1960 through 2011, following the methodology discussed in Brenner,
Harjes, and Kroner (1996). For each month between January of 1986 and December
of 2011, 100 simulations of the interest rate process were generated, and the present
value of ARM costs for holding periods from 1 to 30 years was calculated. These
values were then compared to the present value of an FRM originated in the same
month. As a comparison, following Tucker (1991), simulations based on the random
walk model rTBt  r
TB
t1   σTB  ηt, where σTB, is the monthly standard deviation of
the 1-year Treasury Bill rate. These simulations are indicated with square points.
is plotted against the holding period in years in Figure 1.4. Results are largely
consistent with Tucker (1991). The present value of FRM payments are greater for
all discount rates for holding periods of less than 15 years in the random walk model.
For the GARCH(1,1) model, the present value of FRM payments are greater for
all holding periods and all discount rates, except for a discount rate of 4%, where
the expected present value of ARM payments exceeds those for FRMs for holding
periods of greater than 25 years. Clearly, ARMs can have significant cost advantages
over fixed rate contracts.
These results are tempered somewhat if we look at expected interest costs at the
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time of acquiring a mortgage, as implied by simple forward rates, during the same
time period. Panel (B) of Table 1.14 presents these figures. Calculations are made
using the implied forward treasury rate from year t to t+1. We see that fixed rate
mortgages have far lower expected costs than ARMs. It should be noted however that
these rates do not account for any possible liquidity or term premium that may be a
component in the forward rates, and should be regarded as an upper bound on the
expected interest costs for an adjustable rate loan. Still, there is compelling evidence
that ARMs may have significant advantages over FRMs for some households.
Another possible explanation for the increased propensity to choose an ARM
with mortgage market participation, is that ARMs have the advantages discussed
above, and that households do not know about or understand this early in their
experience with mortgages. van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) demonstrate
that higher financial literacy is associated with higher participation rates in the
stock market, however there are two potential explanations for this. It may be that
more financially literate households better understand the stock market, or it could
be that participation in the stock market leads to higher financial literacy. The
authors suggest “[...] people may be learning as they age and, perhaps, participate
in financial markets” (van Rooij et al., 2011). If there are features of ARMs that
are advantageous relative to FRMs, and households are unaware when getting their
first mortgage, we might expect them to increase their usage of ARMs as they use
more mortgages. The process of participating in the mortgage market may teach
households about these contracts.
van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) show that frequent use of finance and
economics in the work place is associated with higher participation rates in the stock
market. We might expect, then, that people working in the financial or insurance
sectors, or the real estate, renting and leasing sector, might be more apt to choose
an ARM and increase the usage of ARMs faster with participation. Following the
47
previous methodology, we add the variable FWit, taking a value of one if the head of
the household works in the financial or real estate sectors, to the main specification.
This variable is also interacted with our PM jit variables and included in the regression.
As discussed above, we expect the coefficient on FWit to be positive. Results are
presented in column 1 of Table 1.15. There is an increase in propensity to choose
an ARM for households with a head working in the financial sector. Though not
statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient on FWit is quite large. The
coefficients on the interaction terms are also not significant, but they too are large
and increasing, consistent with financial workers learning faster about advantages of
ARMs. With only 260 observations for households with a head in the financial or
real estate sector, statistical power is low, however magnitudes and directions are as
we would expect if ARMs are advantageous and financial workers are better able to
realize this. It should also be noted that the pattern of increasing usage of ARMs
with mortgage market participation is still strong for households not in the financial
sector. Here, as before, the coefficients are monotonically increasing, consistent with
a slower learning process than households working in a financial industry.
We can narrow the scope of the idea of “financial sophistication” to sophistication
in real estate markets, specifically. The PSID includes the question, “What was the
total dollar cost of the additions or improvements, plus the value of any work you
may have done yourself?” for the 1989, 1994 and 1999 through 2009 waves of the
survey. We define the concept of “flipping” as expecting to move soon (the household
responded “probably move” or “definitely move” to the PSID’s question regarding
the likelihood of moving) and spending in the top 30% of all homeowners on home
improvement. Households who flip are buying, improving and selling homes quickly.
Presumably they should become very familiar with mortgage markets during this
process. We would expect “flippers” to learn more quickly about the advantages
of ARMs, as they are interacting with mortgage brokers and banks on a regular
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Table 1.15: This table presents within-household estimates of propensity to choose
ARM. The first column investigates the relationship between mortgage market par-
ticipation, ARM choice propensity and working in the financial or real estate sectors.
The second column addresses households “flipping” properties. The final column in-
vestigates the implications of having obtained a graduate degree, and its interaction
with mortgage market participation. Household clustered standard errors are in
parentheses, with p-values beneath them. * indicates significance at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.Table 9 - PSID Estimation Results, Financial Sophistication, Flipping and Education
Finance Worker Flipping Graduate School
Dependent Variable ARMit ARMit ARMit
FWit 0.2075 FLIPit -0.1969
(0.2324) (0.1957)
0.3721 0.3145
FWit*PM
2 0.082 FLIPit*PM
2 -0.1415 GSi*PM
2 0.1489
(0.1331) (0.1783) (0.1014)
0.5377 0.4275 0.1421
FWit*PM
3,4 0.1356 FLIPit*PM
3,4 0.1191 GSi*PM
3,4 0.2612**
(0.216) (0.21) (0.1048)
0.53 0.5706 0.0127
FWit*PM
5+ 0.2484 FLIPit*PM
5+ 0.5109* GSi*PM
5+ 0.2080*
(0.2723) (0.2757) (0.1208)
0.3616 0.0639 0.0851
PM2 0.0830* 0.0995** 0.0855*
(0.0441) (0.0431) (0.0469)
0.06 0.0209 0.0681
PM3,4 0.1331** 0.1378** 0.1160*
(0.0613) (0.06) (0.0647)
0.0301 0.0217 0.0734
PM5+ 0.2091*** 0.2122*** 0.2110**
(0.0791) (0.0783) (0.0823)
0.0083 0.0067 0.0104
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 44.27% 45.21% 44.87%
N 3,694 3,694 3,502
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basis, and ARMs are also more advantageous for these people. Adding an indicator
variable, FLIPit and interactions terms of FLIPit with PM
j
it variables, we get results
presented in column 2 of Table 1.15. Though not significant, the coefficient on the
interaction term for j = 2 we see that it essentially negates the coefficient on the raw
PM2it term. For j = 3 or 4, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, but not
distinguishable from zero, however for j = 5 or more, the coefficient is positive and
marginally significant. We see that after their second mortgage, the propensity to
choose an ARM increases substantially for flippers. The negative coefficient on the
indicator variable for flipping is interesting, but it is not statistically significant, and
without further theory on the circumstances of households who choose to flip homes,
we have no prior on what the sign of this coefficient should be. It should also be
noted that the main pattern persists for non-flippers, consistent with learning being
an important effect over the whole population.
Though van Rooij et al. (2011) explain that education is not necessarily a good
proxy for financial sophistication, if households are learning, we might expect house-
holds with graduate degrees to be better able to identify the advantages of financial
products with repeated exposure financial markets. We can include interaction terms
of a variable equal to 1 if the head of the household has received a graduate degree,
GSi, with the measures of mortgage market participation. Coefficients on the inter-
action terms, given in Table 1.15 are positive, and for j ¡ 2, significant, indicating
households with graduate degrees increase their usage of ARMs with participation
faster and to a greater degree than other households. This is consistent with house-
holds who likely have an advantage recognizing the benefits of ARMs learning about
those advantages faster and to a greater degree than those with less ability.
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Refinancing
If households are learning by participating in mortgage markets, we might ask how
it is they are learning. It could be that the act of purchasing a home is essential
to the learning, or it might be that purchase of the home unimportant, and it is
the interaction with mortgage brokers that leads to this increased knowledge and
understanding. We can turn to refinancing as a way to test this. An indicator variable
for refinancing, REFIit is created and interacted with measures of mortgage market
participation. Regression results are presented in Table 1.16, along with the main
specification for comparison and convenience. We see that an indicator variable for
the loan being for refinancing purposes is negative and marginally significant, while
the interaction terms are approximately zero and not significant. There is a level
effect whereby refinancing loans are less likely to be into adjustable rate products,
but there is little difference in the context of increasing propensity to choose an ARM
with mortgage market participation.
This is consistent with the way refinancing loans are treated vis-a-vis purchase
money loans in some states 1. While purchase money loans are universally non-
recourse loans, where the most the bank can get back in the event of default is the
value of the home, if the loan was for refinancing purposes, the bank can potentially
garner wages or force the sale of other assets. With this difference in the treatment of
the two loan types, refinance loans are relatively riskier and thus there is motivation
not to choose an ARM. Additionally, one of the primary reasons to refinance quoted
in most personal finance books is to “lock in a better rate.” To the extent house-
holds adhere to this type of advice and it affects all households relatively equally, we
would expect refinancing loans to be FRMs relatively more often. This would also
show up as a level effect in this specification. The increasing propensity to choose
1 for example, that state of California for loans originating before January 1, 2013
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Table 1.16: This table presents regression coefficients including an indicator variable,
REFIit, and interacting it with measures of mortgage market participation. It shows
that there is a level effect, whereby households who are refinancing have a lower
propensity to choose an ARM, but do increase their usage with participation. Robust
p-values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level.
Main Refinance
Dependent Variable ARMit ARMit
PM2 0.0860** 0.0538
(0.0475) (0.2702)
PM3,4 0.1505** 0.1394**
(0.0266) (0.0412)
PM5+ 0.2194*** 0.2322**
(0.0059) (0.0123)
Refiit -0.1124*
(0.0544)
Refiit*PM
2 0.0939
(0.1449)
Refiit*PM
3,4 0.0339
(0.6443)
Refiit*PM
5+ 0.0247
(0.7707)
Controls and FE Yes Yes
R2 43.89% 44.06%
N 3,694 3,694
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an ARM even among households choosing to refinance suggests that households are
not learning through the purchase process, per se, but through the financing process.
Originating/refinancing a mortgage seems to have a similar effect, suggesting inter-
action with mortgage brokers and associated research is what drives the “learning.”
1.3.2 SCF
Variables
We now turn to the SCF for external validation of results from the PSID. The SCF
is usually structured as a series of representative cross-sectional surveys. However,
the Federal Reserve Board chose to re-interview the 2007 sample to gauge how the
extraordinary economic events of the 2007-2009 period affected household finances.
Because there are only two panels in the survey, only a relative measure of previous
mortgages could be imputed. In both the 2007 and 2009 surveys, the questionnaire
asks “Is there a mortgage or land contract on this property, or another type of loan
that uses this property as collateral?” The survey goes on to ask “Did you take out
this mortgage to: refinance or rollover an earlier loan, borrow additional money on
your home equity, or to do both? ” The answers to these two questions can be used
to impute a measure of previous mortgages. If the household had a loan in 2007,
but it was not to refinance a previous loan, the number of mortgage is set to one.
If the purpose of that loan was to refinance an earlier contract, then we know the
household has had at least two mortgages in its history. If a new mortgage is taken
out between 2007 and 2009 we add one to the number of previous loans. In the end
we are only interested in within-household variation, so this relative measure of the
number of mortgages is sufficient and we do not need to worry about how many loans
a household actually had before the sample period.
The model in which we are interested is:
ARMit  Γ  PREV IOUS MORTGAGEit   β Xit   Θ HFEi   it (1.2)
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Table 1.17: This table presents the main covariates used in the regression analysis
of the Survey of Consumer Finances
Variable Description
DEFINITELY MOVE Self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years of 100%
LIKELY MOVE Self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years more than or 
equal to 80%, but less than 100%
PROBABLY MOVE Self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years between 20% 
and 80%
MAYBE MOVE Self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years less than or 
equal to 20%, but not definitely staying
NET WORTH Assets less liabilities of the household
NW/PRINCIPAL Net worth normalized by original principal on the mortgage
TOTAL INCOME Total household income from all sources for the year in which the 
mortgage was originated
MPMT/INCOME Total annual mortgage payments normalized by total income
INCOME VOLATILITY Ratio of a household's total income to the household's self reported 
"normal" income.
LOAN-TO-VALUE
Original principal as a percentage of the purchase price of the home
LOAN-TO-VALUE2 Loan-to-value squared
REFINANCE
Indicator equal to 1 if the loan was to refinance an existing mortgage
EMPLOYED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is employed
AGE Age of the head of the household
AGE2/100 Age of the head squared
CHILDREN Indicator equal to 1 if children are part of the household
MALE Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is male
MARRIED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is divorced
DIVORCED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is married
WIDOWED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is widowed
SEPARATED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is separated
EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRY Set of indicator variables for the industry in which the household is 
employed
Where ARMit is, as before, an indicator for whether household i chose an adjustable
rate mortgage at time t. The vector Γ is the coefficient on PREV IOUS MORTGAGEit,
which is also defined as before, however now we have j P t2, 3u. The variable Xit
is a vector of control variables including those listed in Table 1.17 most of which
were discussed above. Because we are interested in within household variation, the
within-estimator is used, which is equivalent to including household binary variables,
HFEi. It is important to note that the estimation sample contains only mortgage
choice decisions observed in the 2007 survey for loans that were acquired in 2006 or
2007 and mortgage choice decisions in the 2009 survey for loans that were acquired
in 2008 or 2009.
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As discussed earlier, the shorter the expected tenure of a household in a given
home, the larger the relative benefits of an adjustable rate mortgage. The mea-
sures of moving probability are slightly finer in the Survey of Consumer Finances.
The SCF’s panel survey included the question, “Using any number from zero to
100, where zero equals no chance and 100 equals absolutely certain, what do you
think the chances are that you will be living at your current address two years from
now?” Indicator variables for the households expected probability of moving are
included to account for this effect in a non-parametric way. These variables include
DEFINITELY MOV Eit, which takes a value of one if the household reports zero
chance of staying at their current address. For a reported probability of staying
greater than zero, but less than or equal to 20%, LIKLEY MOV Eit is set to one.
The variable PROBABLY MOV Eit takes a value of one for reported probabilities
between 20% and 80%, not inclusive, and MAY BE MOV Eit is one when the re-
ported probability of staying is greater than or equal to 80%, but less than 100%.
The baseline case is if the household reports it is staying at its current address with
100% probability.
The coefficient vector of interest is Γ  rγ2 γ3s. If households are increasing their
usage of adjustable rate mortgages as they participate in the mortgage market, γ2
and γ3 should be positive, and monotonically increasing. That is, we should have
γ2, γ3 ¡ 0 and γ3 ¡ γ2.
The SCF does not have information in the public release data files on geographic
location of households, so unlike in the PSID, regional fixed effects are not included.
However, broad employment industry dummy variables and a measure of the volatil-
ity of income are included. One of the most important considerations in the mortgage
choice decision is household income volatility, which is correlated to industry of em-
ployment. The SCF collapses employment industry into seven broad categories, and
an indicator for each of these industries is added to the regression. Additionally,
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the SCF asks the question “Is this [total] income unusually high or low compared to
what you would expect in a “normal” year?” The survey goes on to ask, “About what
would your total income have been if it had been a normal year?” and the “normal ”
income is then recorded. As an additional measure of income volatility, the variable
INCOME V OLATILITYit, which is equal to the ratio of total reported income to
the reported value of “normal” income, is included.
Mortgage Choice in the SCF
The longitudinal nature of the data makes it possible to investigate within-household
propensities. Table 1.18 presents results for the main specification. The coefficients
on the variables for the number of previous mortgages are as expected: positive and
monotonically increasing. However, we fail to get statistical significance below the
10% level. Even with such a short panel, the Survey of Consumer Finances 2009
Panel only has two observations for each household, we get marginal significance for
the coefficient on PM2it. Looking at the other controls, we see that again, measures
of mobility are important determinants of the choice of mortgage contract. Though
the coefficients do not increase monotonically, they are mostly significant and all
are positive. The measure INCOME V OLATILITY loads significantly, indicat-
ing large positive differences between current income and “normal” income increase
the propensity to choose an ARM. Contrasting with the estimates for the PSID,
EMPLOY ED loads positively and with marginal significance, however similar to
the PSID the coefficient on AGE is negative and significant at the 5% level. The
coefficient on CHILDREN is negative and marginally significant. Interestingly,
MARRIED and DIV ORCED load negatively, while in the PSID the coefficient on
MARRIED was insignificant and on DIV ORCED was positive and significant.
We can repeat some of the analysis from above. Table 1.19 presents additional
specifications, with the first column showing the main specification for comparison,
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Table 1.18: This table presents estimates for the regression of ARMit on relative
measures of mortgage market participation and controls in the SCF. Robust p-values
are in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. * indicates significane at the 10%
level, ** indicates signficance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the
1% level.
ARMit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PM2it 0.3069** 0.2813* 0.2685* 0.2542* 0.2415* 0.2132
(0.0365) (0.0623) (0.0781) (0.0683) (0.0868) (0.1435)
PM3it 0.5400** 0.4999** 0.4788** 0.4906** 0.4690** 0.4125*
(0.0215) (0.037) (0.0471) (0.026) (0.0344) (0.071)
MAYBE MOVE 0.1777** 0.1859** 0.2196** 0.2253*** 0.2225**
(0.0476) (0.0365) (0.0124) (0.01) (0.0105)
PROBABLY MOVE 0.0244 0.0321 -0.0078 -0.0053 0.0649
(0.8607) (0.8181) (0.9544) (0.9689) (0.5379)
LIKELY MOVE 0.3011** 0.3632** 0.5194*** 0.5183*** 0.4950***
(0.0257) (0.0108) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0031)
DEFINITELY MOVE 0.1322 0.1386 0.1555 0.1587 0.2440**
(0.2726) (0.2479) (0.1845) (0.1747) (0.0415)
NET WORTH 0.0000* 0 0
(0.0658) (0.2954) (0.2194)
NW/PRINCIPAL -0.0149 -0.0121 -0.0113
(0.1647) (0.2173) (0.2238)
TOTAL INCOME 0.0000* 0 0
(0.0863) (0.1448) (0.2563)
MPMT/INCOME 0.3771 0.3715 -0.2091
(0.2739) (0.2865) (0.5667)
INCOME SURPRISE 0.3815*** 0.3819*** 0.2929**
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0107)
LTV 0.1381 0.1381
 (0.5122) (0.5122)
LTV2 -0.0299
(0.1567)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 39% 41% 41% 46% 46% 50%
N 1,028       1,028       1,028       1,027       1,027       1,025      
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the second through fourth columns relating to income, and the final two relating to
education and information acquisition. Column 2 presents results investigating the
interaction of household beliefs about inflation and their income, and the choice of
an ARM in the context of mortgage market participation. In both 2007 and 2009,
the SCF asked respondents “Over the next year, do you expect your total (family)
income to go up more than prices, less than prices, or about the same as prices?” An
indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent felt their purchasing power
would increase over the next year was included and interacted with the relative
number of mortgages the household has used. We would expect those who expect
real income to increase in the future to be more inclined to risk the variable payments
of an ARM, and this is what we see, though coefficients are not significant. In the
third column, results are presented for a regression including a variable equal to 1
if the household indicates they “usually have a good idea” of what their family’s
income will be the following year. Coefficients on the interaction terms are positive
and increasing, however, they are insignificant. The fourth column analysis if those
who had a large positive shock to income (in the top 25% of households, measure
relative to normal income) are driving the results. Interestingly, the interaction term
for 3 mortgages is negative and significant. It is possible these households are not
expecting future income to be as high, and are unwilling to risk the variable payments
of an ARM.
The fifth column of Table 1.19 interacts an indicator equal to 1 if the household
head has a graduate degree with the measures of mortgage market participation. Co-
efficients are again insignificant, however, the pattern on raw participation variables
persists, and is more pronounced for those with a graduate degree. Additionally,
the direction of the coefficients is consistent with those from the PSID. In the sixth
column, a variable taking a value of 1 if the household head uses the internet as
his primary source of information about borrowing is included and interacted with
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Table 1.19: This table gives coefficient estimates from fixed effect regression models
of ARMit on the measures of mortgage market participation. All estimates are
computed accounting for the multiple imputation methods used by the SCF and using
survey provided weights. Household clustered standard errors are in parentheses
with p-values beneath them. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.Table 14 - Coefficient Estimates, SCF
Indicator Increasing PP Knows Income Pos. Inc. Shock Grad School E-Finance
Dependent Variable ARMit ARMit ARMit ARMit ARMit ARMit
PM2it 0.2132 0.1735 0.1843 0.2071 0.2277 0.248
(0.1456) (0.1836) (0.2091) (0.1615) (0.1445) (0.1712)
0.1435 0.3448 0.3785 0.2 0.1154 0.1477
PM3it 0.4125* 0.3484 0.2448 0.4284* 0.3569 0.4228
(0.2282) (0.2661) (0.3033) (0.2367) (0.2345) (0.2603)
0.071 0.1908 0.4198 0.0707 0.1283 0.1047
Indicator 0.0131 0.0335 0.4340* 0.1332
(0.188) (0.1827) (0.2246) (0.1813)
0.9446 0.8547 0.0537 0.4626
Indicator*PM2it 0.0599 0.0221 -0.3195 -0.0934 -0.0803
(0.2328) (0.1991) (0.2602) (0.1562) (0.1999)
0.797 0.9117 0.2197 0.5499 0.688
Indicator*PM3it 0.321 0.1624 -0.6051** 0.2374 -0.0359
(0.3022) (0.1989) (0.2539) (0.2429) (0.2432)
0.2884 0.4144 0.0174 0.3287 0.8826
Controls and FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 49.96% 51.67% 50.54% 52.88% 51.76% 51.04%
N 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025
Table 14 gives coefficient estimates from a fixed effect regression model on the measures of mortgage market participation. All estimates are computed accounting for the multiple
imputation methods used by the SCF and using survey provided weights. Household clustered standard errors are in parentheses with p-values beneath them. * indicates significance at
the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
participation variables. Coefficients on the interaction terms are close to zero, and
the pattern for mortgage contract choice, though again not significant, is still there
for those who do not use the internet as their primary source for information on
borrowing.
Also notice that, though significance is lost in all but the specification for a large
income shock, the pattern of increasing propensity to choose an ARM increasing with
mortgage market participation is a feature of the SCF as well as the PSID. With
such a short panel, statistical power is low for within-household effects, however,
results align with those from the PSID, particularly in the case of mortgage market
participation. Though results are not as significant, it is clear that the phenomenon
of increasing propensity to choose an ARM is not isolated to the PSID.
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1.4 Conclusion
A household’s choice between an adjustable rate mortgage and a fixed rate mortgage
has never been empirically investigated in a time-series context. Previous stud-
ies have looked at mortgage contract choice in a cross-sectional framework only.
The positive relationship between mortgage market participation and propensity to
choose an ARM discussed in this paper is a novel stylized fact not previously doc-
umented. This pattern is robust to an array of cross-sectional factors previously
shown to influence the choice of an adjustable rate mortgage. Evidence is present
supporting household learning as a possible explanation for this observed pattern.
Additionally, this phenomenon is not confined to a single data set, but is observed
in both the PSID and the SCF.
Financial market participation could have significant effects on other markets as
well. As van Rooij et al. (2011) show, stock market participation is highly correlated
with financial literacy, however, the direction of causality is not known. It is unclear
if households who are financially literate participate, or households who participate
become financially literate. While this paper gives some evidence that participation
may affect literacy, this needs to be investigated in other contexts. One potential
avenue is investigating diversification in the context of stock market participation.
It would be interesting to see if households are better diversified after longer or more
concentrated interaction with stock markets.
Finally, if participation influences decisions, what is changing for households? Is
it an understanding of the risks involved, the institutional details of the market, or
just a general understanding of financial concepts? If they are acquiring information
by participating in financial markets, it suggests better education is needed prior to
entering the marketplace. However, without knowing what it is households might
be learning, no recommendation can be made regarding what information should
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be presented to consumers. The evidence presented suggests theory should account
for experience in financial markets when household decisions are being considered.
Guidance is needed for empirical researchers regarding how a household’s acquisition
of information influences financial markets and how households interact with those
markets.
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2Participation Effects and Optimal Refinancing
2.1 Introduction
In the U.S., households have almost $9.4 trillion in mortgage liabilities, which is more
than half of their total real estate assets of about $18.4 trillion 1. With mortgages
being such large liabilities for households, refinancing is one of the most important
financial decisions a household will make in its lifetime.
Borrowers refinance existing mortgages for several reasons. First and foremost, a
household will refinance in order to lower the interest rate it pays on the loan (Canner,
Luckett, and Durkin, 1990). This may have several advantages for the household,
including lowering the monthly payment, or allowing the household to pay off the
mortgage more quickly. Additionally, borrowers may refinance to remove equity from
their home, for any of a number of reasons, including to pay off other debts, invest
in a personal business, or send children to college (Canner et al., 1990). There are
many studies where optimal refinancing rates, that interest rate below which it is
optimal to refinance when households are not motivated by equity extraction, are
1 Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
June, 2013
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calculated: Dunn and McConnell (1981), Chen and Ling (1989), Yang and Maris
(1996), Longstaff (2005), Kalotay, Yang, and Fabozzi (2004, 2007, 2008) and most
recently, Agarwal et al. (2012).
This study uses the method of Agarwal et al. (2012) to calculate optimal refinanc-
ing rates for households in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and shows
that the propensity to refinance optimally increases with mortgage market partici-
pation, as measured by the number of previous mortgages used by the household.
Increasing optimal refinancing with participation in mortgage markets is a novel fact,
not previously documented, and is both robust to, and stronger when, controlling
for equity extraction as the motivation for refinancing. This is consistent with an in-
formation acquisition model whereby households gain knowledge and understanding
of financial transactions by participating in financial markets.
Previous authors have investigated the determinants of a household’s decision to
refinance 2. Green and Shoven (1986) shows that the probability of refinancing is
negatively related to a the size of the “lock-in”, which is the difference between the
book and market value of the mortgage, normalized by the approximate value of the
home. The strength of this lock-in effect was shown to be decreasing with tenure
in the home by Quigley (1987). That study also relates prepayment of a mortgage
to family size and education of the household head, showing prepayment is posi-
tively related to both variables. Consistent with the option to wait on refinancing
being more valuable with higher interest rate volatility, 3, Giliberto and Thibodeau
(1989) shows that the term of a mortgage loan is increasing in interest rate volatility.
Giliberto and Thibodeau (1989) also shows that loan tenure is negatively related to
household income. This suggest that an ability to afford increased payments can in-
crease the likelihood of refinancing to cash out equity. Supporting the argument that
2 see Dickinson and Heuson (1994) for an excellent review of the this literature, to that point.
3 see Kau and Keenan (1995) for an overview of option-theoretic pricing of mortgages
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higher income increases the propensity to refinance, Dickinson and Heuson (1992)
finds that borrowers will require a smaller savings in monthly payments when their
income is substantially higher than required to support the incumbent mortgage.
Additionally, the authors show that a smaller payment savings will be required to
refinance when the value of the home has risen substantially since purchase.
While the majority of mortgage loans in the United States are fixed rate mort-
gages (FRMs), a substantial fraction of mortgages are of the adjustable rate variety
(ARM). Consequently, the literature has focused on FRMs, however a few authors
have looked at termination behavior when the incumbent loan is an adjustable rate
mortgage. Zorn and Lea (1989), using data on ARMs in Canada, showed that the
indirect utility of prepayment to the ARM borrower is negatively related to the op-
portunity and real costs of prepayment, including the rate of return on other assets,
prepayment penalty and cost of leasing or renting. Simultaneously, prepayment util-
ity was shown to be positively related appreciation in housing prices and the mortgage
contract rate. This suggests the motivations, both financial and non-financial, are
similar for ARM and FRM borrowers. Contrasting to the incentives to refinance for
an FRM borrower, Cunningham and Capone (1990) shows that ARM prepayments
are less positively related to the slope of the yield curve and are negatively related
to the size of interest rate adjustment caps for both the individual adjustments and
life-of-loan caps.
These papers all investigate determinants of prepayment cross-sectionally. This
thesis will break from this pattern, and examine how the behavior of household
changes across time. Additionally, whereas previous studies look at prepayment
overall, this study investigates optimal refinancing, casting it in the context of mort-
gage market participation.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section 2 will discuss the data
used, section 3 will present results, and section 4 will conclude.
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2.2 Data
The data used in this study come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
administered by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The
PSID is a longitudinal survey conducted annually from 1968 to 1997, and biennially
since 1997. The most recent year for which data are available is 2009. See section
2.1 and Table 1.1 of Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of the PSID data.
This study augments the data provided in the PSID with estimates of the optimal
refinancing rate when equity extraction is not a motivation, following the method
of Agarwal et al. (2012) 4. These figures are used to generate a sample of optimal
refinancing events in the PSID. Optimal refinancing rates are a function of several
variables 5. The variable,RemPrincit, is the remaining principal on the existing
mortgage. The larger the remaining principal is, the higher the optimal refinanc-
ing rate will be, because interest costs are proportionally larger for a loan with a
higher principal. The number of years left on the existing mortgage is represented
by Y rsRemainingit. The higher this value is, the higher the optimal interest rate
will be, resulting from having a larger proportion of interest costs remaining to be
paid on the incumbent loan. TaxRateit is the marginal tax rate and has a nega-
tive relationship with the optimal refinancing rate. This is a consequence of the tax
advantaged status of interest payments. Remaining time in the home is included
as ExpTenureit, which has a positive relationship with the optimal refinancing rate
because the household will have a longer time to reap the benefit of a lower in-
terest rate. Pointsit and CloseCostsit are the points and fixed costs on the new
mortgage, respectively. As we would expect, these have a negative relationship with
the optimal refinancing rate, as a higher payment savings is required to offset these
4 see http://zwicke.nber.org/refinance/ where the authors provide a calculator for the optimal
refinance rate
5 see Table 2.1 for definitions of variable names
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costs. Finally, we have DiscountRate, AvgInflation, and MortgRateSD, which
represent the household’s discount rate, expected average inflation over the life of
the new loan, and mortgage interest rate volatility. Discount rates have a negative
relationship with the optimal refinancing rate, as the present value of future savings
is relatively lower. As well, higher average inflation reduces the real value of future
savings, and induces a lower required interest rate to refinance optimally. Due to
the well known relationship between volatility of the underlying and the value of
an option, higher mortgage rate volatility induces a lower required refinancing rate,
because the option to wait for an even lower rate is more valuable.
Table 2.1: This table presents and explains the variables used to calculate the optimal
refinancing interest rates following the method in Agarwal et al. (2012)
RemPrincit Remaining principal in incumbent loan at of household i at time t
Y rsRemainingit Remaining term on incumbent loan
InterestRateit Interest rate for incumbent loan
TaxRateit Household marginal income tax rate
ExpTenureit Years expected to remain in the home
Pointsit Points on the new mortgage
CloseCostsit Other closing costs on the new mortgage
DiscountRate Annual discount rate
AvgInflation Average expected inflation over life of new loan
MRateSD Annualized standard deviation of mortgage interest rates
Values for RemPrincit, InterestRateit, Y rsRemainingit, and TaxRateit were
taken directly from the PSID to calculate optimal refinancing rates. The taxable in-
come reported by household in the PSID was used to ascertain a household’s marginal
tax rate, TaxRateit. Using the National Association of Realtors Profile of Homebuy-
ers and Sellers (PHS) 6 from 2006-2009 and the self reported probabilities of moving
discussed in Chapter 1, households were assigned values for expected tenure as fol-
lows: if a household reported they would definitely move within two years, they were
6 see http://www.realtor.org/topics/profile-of-home-buyers-and-sellers for the current survey re-
sults
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assigned a value of two for ExpTenureit. If they reported the would probably move,
or might move, they were assigned an expected tenure of 4 or 6 years, respectively.
If a household answered that they could not assign a likelihood to their moving, they
were assigned an expected tenure based on their age and the reported medians by age
groups in the PHS. Since this value was not reported in the PHS years before 2006,
the 2006 values were used for all previous years 7. Pointsit were assigned according
to the annual national averages released by Freddie Mac as part of their Primary
Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS). 8 Finally, following calibrations in Agarwal et al.
(2012), household discount rate was assumed to be 5%, expected inflation was as-
sumed to be 3%, closing costs were assumed to be $2,000 and volatility of mortgage
rates was assumed to be 1.04% for all households.
2.3 Optimal Refinancing in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Using the data discussed above, a panel of optimal refinancing events was generated,
where a household refinanced when the national 30-year fixed rate mortgage rate,
as released in the PMMS, was below a household’s optimal refinancing rate. An
indicator variable, OptRefiit taking a value of one if a household optimally refinanced
when they should have refinanced, is regressed on a number of covariates. The most
relevant of these regressors to our study are PM jit, j  3, 4, 5 , where j represents
the number of previous mortgages the household has used. The remainder of the
covariates are similar to those from Chapter 1, but are presented in Table 2.2 for
convenience.
Our main empirical specification is
OptRefiit  Γ  PMit   β Xit   Ψ  AFEit   it (2.1)
7 It should be noted that other variables, such as tenure in previous home, remained relatively
constant from 2003-2005, the first three years the PHS was available
8 see http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/ for more information and historical data
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Table 2.2: This table presents the controls used in the main regressions, to be pre-
sented and discussed below
Variable Description
DEFINITELY MOVE Indicator for self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years of 
LIKELY MOVE Indicator for self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years being 
"probably move"
MAYBE MOVE Indicator for self reported probability of moving in the next 2 years being 
"maybe move"
NET WORTH Assets less liabilities of the household
NW/HOUSE VALUE Net worth normalized by original principal on the mortgage
HVAL/INCOME Value of the home normalized by total income
TOTAL INCOME Total household income from all sources for the year in which the 
mortgage was originated
INCOME/MPMT Total annual mortgage payments normalized by total income
LOAN-TO-VALUE Original principal as a percentage of the purchase price of the home
LOAN-TO-VALUE2 Loan-to-value squared
EMPLOYED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is employed
RETIRED Indicator equal to 1 if the head is retired.
AGE Age of the head of the household
AGE2/100 Age of the head squared
CHILDREN Indicator equal to 1 if children are part of the household
NUM CHILDREN The number of dependent children in the household
MALE Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is male
WIFE POWER A measure of the realative bargaining power of the wife in the household
MARRIED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is divorced
DIVORCED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is married
WIDOWED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is widowed
SEPARATED Indicator equal to 1 if the head of the household is separated
where PMit  rPM
3
it PM
4
it PM
5 
it s, Xit is a vector of controls, discussed above and
presented in Table 2.2 and AFEit is a vector of fixed effects, including household,
time and time interacted with industry of employment. Regressions are restricted
to households who have use two or more mortgages, and have consequently had a
chance to refinance at least once, and who should refinance, but may or may not. Our
main interest is in how a household’s propensity to refinance optimally increases with
participation in mortgage markets, so the focus will be on the coefficient estimates
on the vector PMit
The main results are presented in Table 2.3. We see that in all models, the
propensity to optimally refinance is increasing in mortgage market participation.
We should note that inclusion of the income variables has the biggest effect on the
estimated coefficients on the PM j variables. This is consistent with the literature
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discussed above, showing that households with higher income require smaller pay-
ment savings to refinance. It is likely that these households are following popular
advice regarding refinancing, such as the break even rule, and doing it too soon. In
the setup here, that could qualify as a sub-optimal refinancing, which explains the
negative sign on the coefficient for income normalized by housing payment.
Table 2.3: This table shows the effects of participation on optimal refinancing. Co-
efficients should be interpreted as within household contributions to the propensity
to refinance optimally. For the mortgage market participation variables, PM j, co-
efficients are difference in the propensity to refinance optimally relative to the first
potential refinancing event (i.e. the second mortgage). P-values for the coefficients
are in parentheses, and use heteroskedastic robust and clustered standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PM3 0.0295** 0.0299** 0.0701*** 0.0493*** 0.0705*** 0.0615**
(0.0159) (0.0229) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0224)
PM4 0.0820*** 0.0825*** 0.1331*** 0.1017*** 0.1330*** 0.1330***
(0) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0) (0.0003) (0.0023)
PM5+ 0.0935*** 0.0957*** 0.1711*** 0.1251*** 0.1715*** 0.1614***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0) (0.0005) (0.0036)
MAYBE MOVE 0.0078 -0.0009 0.006 -0.0007 0.0073
(0.4372) (0.9772) (0.6794) (0.9805) (0.8189)
LIKELY MOVE 0.0059 0.0314 0.0248 0.0318 0.064
(0.6297) (0.4535) (0.2255) (0.4509) (0.1544)
DEFINITELY MOVE 0.0066 0.0037 0.0123 0.0039 -0.0036
(0.6113) (0.9223) (0.5155) (0.9187) (0.93)
HVAL/INCOME -0.0004** -0.0004* -0.0005*
(0.0348) (0.0504) (0.0552)
TOTAL INCOME -0.0071*** -0.0068** -0.0094**
(0.0079) (0.0284) (0.0161)
INCOME/MPMT 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005
(0.1085) (0.1098) (0.4617)
NET WORTH 0* 0 0
(0.0513) (0.7694) (0.9905)
NW/HOUSE VALUE 0.0014 0.0012 0.0032
(0.3746) (0.8657) (0.7025)
LOAN-TO-VALUE 0.0073
(0.9205)
LOAN-TO-VALUE2 -0.0478
(0.3532)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 39% 40% 48% 43% 48% 52%
N 8,092          7,869        4,685          6,464          4,685          4,263          
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2.3.1 Equity Extraction and Optimal Refinancing
One of the primary motivations for refinancing is to extract equity from the a house-
hold’s home. One might want to do this for several reasons, including home im-
provement, unexpected or large expenses like college tuition for children or continu-
ing education or a need for cash due to illness or unemployment. I repeat the main
analysis, but exclusively control for cross sectional differences in these factors by
creating indicator variables and interacting them with measures of mortgage mar-
ket participation. Results are presented in Table 2.4, where indicator variables are
shown at the top of each column and include a large amount of time spent ill and
unable to work (ILLTIME30), a large (more than a month) amount of time spent
unemployed (UEMPTIME30), children in, or soon to be in, college (CHILD15),
and large school expenses relative to income (SEI0.2), which is defined to be school
expenses in excess of 20% of total household income.
The most interesting results are for time spent without working, due to illness
or unemployment. Interestingly, there is a large and significant level effect due to
inability to work. For both columns one and two, the intercept for groups indicated by
ILLTIME30 and UEMPTIME30 is large and negative, indicating these two groups
tend to optimally refinance less, overall. This is exactly what would be expected if
they were not refinancing to take advantage of low rates, but because other life
circumstances demanded they remove equity from their home. It is important to
note that this effect does not influence the main result, that households are more
likely to optimally refinance with greater mortgage market participation. As well,
even households motivated by equity extraction have a greater propensity to refinance
optimally if with more mortgage market participation, as indicated by the small and
insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms.
Having a child soon to be, or in, college or otherwise high school related expense,
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Table 2.4: This table repeats the main analysis, but includes indicator variables for
potential equity extraction motivation interacted with measures of mortgage market
participation. These include a large amount of time spent ill and unable to work
(ILLTIME30) or a large amount of time spent unemployed (UEMPTIME30), chil-
dren in, or soon to be in, college (CHILD15) and large school expenses relative to
income (SEI0.2). Please see the text for a detailed discussion of these variables.
P-values are in parentheses below point estimates. * indicates significane at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
ILLTIME30 UEMPTIME30 CHILD15 SEI0.2
PM2 0.0538* 0.0600* 0.0641** 0.0611**
(0.0782) (0.0504) (0.0179) (0.0238)
PM3,4 0.1090** 0.1157** 0.1412*** 0.1183***
(0.0188) (0.0128) (0.0015) (0.0075)
PM5+ 0.1376** 0.1356** 0.1595*** 0.1508***
(0.0159) (0.0173) (0.0043) (0.0067)
INDit -0.0837*** -0.1015*** 0.0229 -0.1297
(0.0015) (0.0001) (0.6025) (0.2472)
INDit*PM
3 0.0066 0.0237 -0.0361 0.1636
(0.8241) (0.4286) (0.523) (0.1579)
INDit*PM
4 0.0508 0.0217 -0.1514** 0.3573**
(0.2823) (0.632) (0.0433) (0.0334)
INDit*PM
5+ 0.0512 -           0.0363 0.0613
(0.5516) -           (0.7324) (0.7366)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
52.4% 52.4% 52.1% 52.4%
4,263 4,263 4,263 4,228
might also be a motivation for equity extraction. In the third column of Table 2.4,
an indicator variable if the youngest child in the household is over 15 years of age
is included and interacted with measures of mortgage market participation. The
idea here is that a household with a youngest child nearing college, is likely to have
a college age child already, or at least be thinking about upcoming college tuition
expenses. This could be motivation to refinance the home and extract equity. We see
that, this might be the case, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient
on the interaction term with PM4, however the main results hold for households
who do not have a soon to be college age youngest dependent.
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Along similar lines to the inclusion of an indicator for a college age child in the
household, the PSID includes direct measures of school expense. If this is large
relative to income (defined here as more than 20% of income), we might expect the
household to extract equity to pay for these educational expenses. We see in column
four of Table 2.4 that these households, if increase their propensity to optimally
refinance at a higher rate than the general population, as shown by the positive
coefficients, and the significant coefficient on the interaction term with PM4. Overall
the results presented in this section are consistent both with equity extraction driving
sub-optimal refinancing, and an increased propensity to refinance optimally with
mortgage market participation, even when equity extraction concerns are controlled
for.
2.4 Conclusion
It is important to understand how and why households make financial decisions. In
aggregate, household assets account for a substantial fraction of all assets in the
United States economy. In addition, if households are making fundamental mistakes
in their financial life, as some research suggests, it is important we understand if they
can improve that behavior. This study demonstrates that one mechanism through
which households improve their understanding and knowledge of financial markets is
participation. The simple, but potentially costly, act of repeatedly using mortgage
products leads to more optimal outcomes at an individual household level.
On a more general note, the fact that households are improving financial decision
making by participation suggests there is room for improvement in our financial
education system. Making mistakes when getting a mortgage can be very costly. As
demonstrated, home values are typically well above 50% of total household assets for
much of the wealth distribution, and most of this is financed through a mortgage.
Better education of households is an opportunity to save them and the economy
72
money in the long run.
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